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 Diﬀerential Income Taxation and




This paper empirically investigates the eﬀects of diﬀerential income taxation on house-
holds’ portfolio choice and asset allocation applying a two-stage budgeting model of asset
demand to German survey data. The model is structured into the discrete asset choice and
the continuous asset choice, and the marginal income tax rate is simulated in a module of
income taxation. Households that face relatively higher tax rates are found to have rela-
tively greater demand for tax-privileged assets than households in the lower tax brackets.
The higher the marginal tax rate the greater demand is for non-owner-occupied housing,
for mortgage repayments, for building society deposits, for stocks, for insurances, and for
consumer credits, whereas demand is lower for owner-occupied housing, bank deposits,
and bonds.
Keywords: Household asset allocation, portfolio choice, two-stage budgeting, capital in-
come taxation.
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11 Introduction
The asset accumulation behavior of private households in Germany is exposed to a number of
recent developments in income taxation and savings subsidization. The diminishing relevance
of the statutory pension system for old-age income induces German governments to subsidize
private accumulations of ﬁnancial assets for retirement income in the framework of the so
called Riester-scheme (since 2001). The Riester-scheme was extended to the accumulation of
owner-occupied housing assets (Eigenheimrente) in 2008, following an on-going reform of the
subsidization of housing assets in Germany in the recent decades which initiated the abolition
of the home-building allowance (Eigenheimzulage) in 2006. In the course of the latest corpo-
rate tax reform in 2008, a homogeneous tax rate for capital income in the form of a ﬂat tax of
25% (Abgeltungsteuer) was implemented, separating the taxation of capital income from the
taxation of labor income. Such reforms are likely to aﬀect aggregate savings of private house-
holds as well as the allocation of savings between various available assets given a ﬁxed level of
savings, as the relative prices of consumption and savings as well as the relative net returns of
related asset types are altered.1 This paper investigates the eﬀects of diﬀerential taxation of
capital income on households’ decisions of portfolio choice and asset allocation given the level
of savings at the household level.
There is a vast literature of comparable studies that empirically identiﬁes eﬀects of diﬀerential
income taxation on asset allocation.2 One of the ﬁrst studies is from Feldstein (1976). Using
micro data for the US, he ﬁnds positive tax eﬀects on stocks (a 8.6%-points increase in the
conditional share if the marginal tax rate increases by 10%-points3) as well as on tax-privileged
bonds (+1.2%-points) and negative eﬀects on other non-privileged ﬁnancial assets (-7.3%-points
on deposits), while housing assets are not analyzed. More evidence for the US is found by
Hubbard (1985). He generally conﬁrms and extends Feldstein’s results: he ﬁnds signiﬁcant
positive tax eﬀects on debt (+7.0% in the conditional share), on equities (+5.3%), and on
housing assets (+1.8%). Generally, tax eﬀects are found to be stronger on the probability of
positive asset demand than on conditional demand. King and Leape (1998) ﬁnd great tax eﬀects
on the demand probability, but smaller eﬀects on conditional demand (conditional share of
checking accounts increases from 4:9% to 5:8% and of mortgages from 61:1% to 65:6%). Poterba
and Samwick (2002) also ﬁnd signiﬁcant tax eﬀects on the demand probability for most of the
assets, but only for tax-exempt bonds (between +18% and +56% on the unconditional share)
1A comprehensive overview on relevant issues in the ﬁeld of taxation eﬀects on household portfolio choice and
asset allocation is provided by Poterba (2002).
2On the theory of taxation and portfolio allocation, see Auerbach and King (1983).
3All tax eﬀects mentioned in this section that are not in elasticity terms are evaluated for a 10%-points increase
in the marginal tax rate.
2and for non-privileged interest bearing accounts (between -2% and -6% on the unconditional
share), eﬀects on conditional demand are signiﬁcant and robust over time.
Following Feldstein (1976), this issue was also explored for a couple of other countries. For
Canada, Dicks-Mireaux and King (1983) ﬁnd positive eﬀects on the demand probability as
well as on conditional demand for deposits, tax-privileged stocks, and bonds as well as slightly
negative eﬀects on housing demand. Hochguertel, Alessie, and van Soest (1997) ﬁnd positive tax
eﬀects on risky assets using data from the Netherlands, an elasticity of 2.3 for the unconditional
share of stocks and bonds from total ﬁnancial assets. Agell and Edin (1990), using data for
Sweden, ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on the demand probability and on unconditional demand for
tax-privileged ﬁnancial assets (elasticity of 0.4-1.9 for stocks, depending on the speciﬁcation),
on housing assets (elasticity of 0.4-0.5), and on mortgages (elasticity of 0.9-1.4). For Germany,
only Lang (1998) conducts a comparable analysis.4 He ﬁnds positive tax eﬀects on unconditional
demand for tax-privileged life insurances (+2.5%-points) and negative eﬀects on unconditional
demand for building society deposits (-4.8%-points). He uses the same data set that is applied
in the study at hand, but from older cross sections.5
The paper at hand contributes to this literature by constructing a two-stage budgeting model
of asset allocation, where asset demand is a function of the household’s marginal tax rate
(MTR). Given a decision how to allocate disposable income to consumption and to savings,
the household decides how to allocate total assets disposable to ﬁnancial assets and to housing
assets at a ﬁrst stage. Housing assets are then at a second stage further allocated to owner-
occupied housing, to non-owner-occupied housing, and to mortgages, while ﬁnancial assets are
further allocated to bank deposits, to building society deposits, to stocks, to bonds, to life and
private pension insurances, and to consumer credits. Observing the fact that a great number
of households allocate assets to only a subset of all available asset types, the decision of asset
allocation is separated into the decision whether to buy an asset (the discrete asset choice) and
the decision of which share of total assets to allocate to an asset conditional on buying it (the
continuous asset choice). Accounting for simultaneity in these decisions, demand probabilities
are estimated simultaneously for all assets and jointly with conditional demand.
4Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2002) use various tax and subsidy changes during the time of the German
reuniﬁcation to identify signiﬁcant eﬀects on the ownership probabilities of long-term saving contracts,
bonds, and investments in foreign mutual funds.
5Other determinants of household asset allocation are analyzed in various contexts. Asset allocation in the
life-cycle is analyzed by King and Leape (1987), Arrondel and Masson (1990), Ioannides (1992), Alessie,
Hochguertel, and van Soest (2001), Milligan (2005), as well as by Sommer (2005). The impact of labor
income risk on asset choice is investigated by Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996), and Heaton and Lucas
(2002) highlights the eﬀect of entrepreneurial risk. Stock holding behavior is explored by Haliassos and
Bertaut (1995) and Bertaut (1998). Hochguertel and van Soest (2001) investigate the relation between
ﬁnancial and housing assets. Income and wealth eﬀects in particular are treated in Uhler and Cragg (1971).
3Two cross sections from oﬃcial survey data on income and consumption in Germany for 1998
and 2003 provide the variation in the MTR explored. Additional variation results from ﬁrst
implementations of a major income tax reform in the years of 2000/2001. As the MTR is not
observed, it is simulated in a module of capital income taxation. The eﬀects of diﬀerential
income taxation on conditional asset demand as well as on unconditional asset demand are
investigated. The hypothesis tested is that households facing a relatively higher MTR on in-
come allocate a greater fraction of total assets to tax-privileged assets than households with a
relatively lower MTR. Such eﬀects are found and they are relatively strong for owner-occupied
housing, for non-owner-occupied housing, for mortgage repayments, and for insurances. Gener-
ally however, the eﬀect size is rather modest, as the eﬀect of a 10%-points increase in the MTR
on conditional asset shares ranges in absolute value from 0 to less than 5%-points only. In the
next section, the rules on capital income taxation in Germany are brieﬂy introduced, where-
upon a two-stage budgeting model of asset allocation is derived in Section 3. Section 4 deals
with the estimation approach and the identiﬁcation strategy for the tax eﬀects, and Section 5
presents the data set as well as descriptive statistics on portfolio choice and asset allocation.
In Section 6, results for conditional and unconditional tax eﬀects are discussed, and Section 7
concludes.
2 Asset Returns in the German Income Tax Law
Income from the investment of capital (in the following: capital income) is exposed to diﬀer-
ential taxation in Germany. Due to various allowances, tax exemptions, and deductibility of
income-related expenses, the tax treatment is diﬀerent for income from capital and income from
labor, i.e. the tax schedule is not synthetic. Moreover, the treatment of income from capital
diﬀers for the various types of assets under consideration here. In the following, the taxation
regulations concerning capital income in the German income tax law (EStG) are introduced.
The focus here is on the regulations as of the time for which the analysis is undertaken, which
is the years 1998 and 2003. This was a time frame with a lot of variation with respect to
income tax regulations in Germany due to a major tax reform with its ﬁrst implementations
in 2000/2001. The major regulations that are related to capital income are sketched in the
following, especially as far as they are relevant for the assets under consideration here. More
details can be found in the income tax module in Appendix B.
For income from ﬁnancial assets in general, there exists a tax-exempt allowance in the EStG.
It amounts to 6,000 DM for 1998 and 1,550 euros for 2003, both for single tax payers. Income
exceeding this allowance is subject to personal income tax (PIT). Additionally, a withholding
tax on capital income (Kapitalertragsteuer, KEST) is raised at the time and the point where
4the capital income accrued to the taxpayer; it though has only a prepayment character and can
thus be credited against PIT. For housing assets in general, there used to be a subsidization
in form of allowances for deductions of expenses in the EStG, especially for owner-occupied
housing. This allowance has been subject to various changes between 1998 and 2003. For all
types of assets, in addition, income from price arbitrage sales is tax exempt if there is a time
frame of at least six months in 1998 (twelve months in 2003) between buying and selling the
ﬁnancial asset and of at least 24 months between purchase and sale of housing assets in general.
Otherwise, these capital gains are fully subject to PIT in the form of other income from private
disposals.6
Among the various ﬁnancial assets considered here, the treatment of capital income is rela-
tively homogeneous. Capital income from ﬁnancial assets, as far as it exceeds the allowance,
is generally taxable with PIT. Speciﬁcally, interest income from deposits in interest bearing
accounts at banks and in building society savings contracts (Bausparverträge, a kind of home-
ownership savings plans) are fully taxable with PIT (and a prepayment of 30% KEST). Divi-
dends from stocks are also fully taxable with PIT.7 Interests from bonds and other ﬁxed-income
investments are also fully taxable with PIT (30% KEST). Before the Retirement Income Act
in 2005, interest gains (Ertragsanteil) from capital life- and private pension insurance contracts
were tax exempt if contract duration was at least 12 years and contributions were paid for a
minimum of 5 years. Moreover, contributions were tax deductible in terms of old age pension
provision expenses up to a cap (§ 20 EStG). Interest payments on consumer credits could not
be deducted from taxable income.
The treatment of capital income from housing assets, however, is relatively heterogeneous
in the EStG w.r.t. housing assets that are devoted to owner-occupation only and such that
serve other purposes, typically renting. While both forms were greatly subsidized in Germany
during the recent decades, the regulations regarding tax allowances for expenditures for owner-
occupied housing were changed in 1996. If construction was started before 1996, an annual 6%
of the purchasing costs, up to a cap, was deductible for four years and 5% for another four years.
If construction was started after 1996, a tax-exempt home-building allowance subject to income
limits was granted for eight years. Income from speculative trading with owner-occupied real
6Additionally, there is a threshold for tax exemption. In case this threshold is exceeded, the entire amount of
capital gains from price arbitrage sales is taxable.
7There was a shift in the taxation rules for dividends in the EStG in 2000/2001 with respect to the corporate
taxes at the company level that are due when dividends are paid out. In 1998, gross dividends at the
shareholder level were subject to PIT and there was a KEST prepayment of 25%, while the corporate
tax payment was considered as a tax credit (Anrechnungsverfahren). However in 2003, net dividends
were subject to PIT, but with only 50% of the net dividend taxable, and the KEST was reduced to 20%
(Halbeinkünfteverfahren). Net dividends are net of corparate taxes and net of withholding tax on capital
income at the shareholder level.
5estates is fully taxable (§ 23 EStG) if there were less than two years time between buying and
selling the real estate. The “saved rents” of owner-occupied housing (resulting from the absence
of expenditures for alternatively rented ﬂats) are not subject to income taxation. Expenses for
interest on loans for owner-occupied housing could not be deducted from income (§ 21 EStG).
Interest payments on loans for non-owner-occupied housing, however, are tax deductible.
Income from speculative trading with rented real estates was subject to income tax (§ 23
EStG) if the time frame between buying and selling the real estate did not exceed two years
in 1998 (ten years in 2003) or the real estate was owner-occupied during the year of selling
and the entire two years before. Net income from renting or leasing of real estates is entirely
subject to PIT (§ 21 EStG). But, as net income results from reducing gross rental income by
expenses that are related to rental income, e.g. operating, maintenance, and ﬁnancing costs,
net rental income may be negative and may thus reduce taxable income.
Based on the treatment in the EStG, the asset types that are considered in this study shall
be classiﬁed as either relatively more tax-privileged, or relatively less tax-privileged, or not
privileged at all. Among the ﬁnancial assets, capital and private old-age pension insurances are
regarded as tax-privileged assets, stocks and bonds to a lesser extent, whereas bank deposits, as
well as building society deposits and consumer credits are classiﬁed as not privileged. Among
the housing assets, non-owner-occupied housing as well as mortgage repayments are regarded as
greatly tax-privileged and owner-occupied housing as relatively less privileged. This theoretical
classiﬁcation shall be used in Section 6 as a benchmark to evaluate the estimated tax eﬀects.
Firstly, a model of asset allocation is introduced in the next section.
3 Two-Stage Budgeting Model of Asset Allocation
The decision of a household to allocate assets to a portfolio of various available asset types
shall be modeled here in a two-stage budgeting model (2SBM) (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b,
chap. 5), which assumes that there are allocation decisions to be made at two stages.8 In this
section, ﬁrstly total assets disposable for allocation are deﬁned, then the allocation is structured
into the two stages, and ﬁnally asset allocation is embedded in a demand system.
8For a basic portfolio choice model, see Brainard and Tobin (1968). There are several macroeconomic exten-
sions of the Brainard-Tobin model, where asset demand is modeled in a two-stage budgeting model (e.g.
Conrad, 1980; Taylor and Clements, 1983). For a similar approach with micro data, see Lang (1998).
6Deﬁnition of Total Assets Disposable for Allocation
It is assumed that a household intends to hold a certain stock of assets at the end of period
t: Kt. For that purpose, the household can either save the residual of disposable income9 and
consumption, Yt  Ct, or liquidate the stock of asset holdings from period t 1: Kt 1, or raise
loans: Lt. The shift in the capital stock then results from the duality:
Kt   Kt 1






































k is income from loans
raised. Treating loan repayments as assets, the total number of assets available follows as
J  JA + JK.
It may be optimal for the household to reduce the asset stock in some period t, i.e. to dissave
(Kt < Kt 1). This would result in negative net savings (St < 0). However, the decision of
whether to build-up or to reduce the asset stock in a given period t and the decision how to
allocate assets to a portfolio may well be determined by diﬀerent factors. As the focus in this
analysis shall be only on the latter decision, the accumulation of Kt is separated from the asset
allocation here, and it is assumed that St is exogenous. This implies that the allocation of
income between durable consumption (except for housing assets), non-durable consumption,
and savings (i.e. the consumption-savings decision) is assumed to be separable from the asset
allocation decision, as is the labor supply decision.10 The consumption-savings decision is
analyzed in a similar framework in Beznoska and Ochmann (2010), results from which will
be applied here in order to extend the results. Given the level of savings in t, the household
allocates disposable assets between various types of assets.
By the separability assumption, it follows for the decision how to allocate disposable assets
that the origin of the assets does not matter, only the level of disposable assets is relevant.
9Disposable income includes labor income and capital income and is net to income taxes and social security
contributions. Consumption is non-durable as well as durable, though excluding housing.
10Furthermore, by intertemporal separability, it is assumed here that the asset allocation decision today is
not aﬀected by expectations about asset prices and asset returns in the future. These assumptions on
separability may be very restrictive and only approximately valid. A test for separability suggested by
Browning and Meghir (1991) provides evidence here that separability of the asset allocation decision from
the consumption-savings decision should be rejected, while separability from the labor supply decision cannot
be rejected.
7Thus, for the decision whether to allocate disposable assets to housing assets or to ﬁnancial
assets, it is not relevant whether the disposable assets stem from current income, from raising
a loan, or from liquidating the stock of assets. This is not true, however, in case an investment
in an asset is liquidated and then immediately reinvested in the same asset class (so called














k ) 8 k = 1;:::;JK
(2)
Thus, the focus is eﬀectively on net asset accumulations censored at zero, i.e. expenditures for
asset purchases reduced by income from asset liquidations. By this deﬁnition, asset accumula-
tions are non-negative, so that shares from total assets, as they will be deﬁned for the demand
system in Section 3, fall in the interval [0;1].12 The resulting budget, i.e. asset demand at time
t (in the following: total assets disposable), follows from:13







For the detailed deﬁnition of Aj for the J asset categories, see Appendix C.
The Structure of Asset Allocation
Given the decision how much assets to accumulate is taken, the household can generally allocate
total assets disposable, A, to two clusters of assets at a ﬁrst stage (in the following also: the
upper stage):14 housing assets and ﬁnancial assets.15 At a second stage (in the following also:
the lower stage), expenditures devoted to the clusters are simultaneously allocated to asset
sub-categories within the clusters. In the housing cluster, expenditures are further allocated
to owner-occupied housing assets, to non-owner-occupied housing assets, and to mortgage re-
payments. Expenditures for ﬁnancial assets are further allocated to bank deposits (such as
11This is usually the case with ﬁxed-term deposits or money market investments. Such investments usually
have a ﬁxed termination, after which they are often immediately reinvested in the same asset class. In these
cases, neither does the household accumulate any assets, nor does the portfolio structure change.
12If net accumulations were not left-censored at zero, this could result in negative asset shares, which are not
deﬁned. The limitations of restricting the analysis to left-censored accumulations appear to be acceptable.
13Note that thereby this approach focuses on asset ﬂows and models directly asset accumulations, rather than
variations in asset stocks as usual in this literature. See Lang (1998) for a similar approach.
14Given the exogeneity of the consumption-savings decision, this allocation of asset accumulations shall be
labeled the decision at the ﬁrst (or upper) stage here.
15Expenditures for housing assets are to be understood in gross terms, i.e. including loans raised to buy a house.
Reinvestments of business proﬁts are generally excluded from the analysis. They are considered exogenous,
as the stock of corporate assets is not observed in the data.
8savings accounts, ﬁxed deposits, and money market investments), to building society deposits
(home-building savings plans), to stocks (including mutual stock funds, certiﬁcates, and other
shareholdings), to bonds (private and public securities), to capital life and private pension
insurances,16 and to consumer credit repayments.17
Figure 1: The Structure of Asset Allocation
Total Assets Disposable
Housing Assets Financial Assets
Bank
Deposits





Occupied Mortgages Consumer 
Credits
By the two-stage budgeting approach, the sequential decision process, i.e. the decisions of
asset allocation at the two stages, can be analyzed separately for the two stages. The argument
is similar to the one for non-relevance of the origin of disposable assets mentioned earlier.
It results from an assumption of weakly separable preferences for the utility function in this
approach. This means e.g. that the decision how much assets to invest in stocks is only aﬀected
by the decision to allocate total assets to housing and to ﬁnancial assets (and in turn to all
other sub-categories of ﬁnancial assets), but not by the decision how to allocate housing assets
to owner-occupied housing, to non-owner-occupied housing, and to mortgages.18
16In the data, contributions to private old-age pension insurances are not diﬀerentiable into contributions to
regular contracts and to such contracts that are subsidized by state allowances in Germany since 2001, such
as the “Riester-Rente” or the “Rürup-Rente”. Thus, they shall not be further diﬀerentiated in this analysis.
For approaches of evaluating the “Riester-Rente”, see e.g. Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, and Schunk (2006) or
Corneo, Keese, and Schröder (2008).
17Mortgage repayments as well as consumer credit repayments exclude the interest component. Generally,
similar asset classiﬁcations are undertaken in the literature when analyzing asset holdings with the same
data, e.g. by Lahl and Westerheide (2003), by Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel, and Winter
(1999), or by Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2002).
18Separability is again tested for here by the test from Browning and Meghir (1991). For this test, the demand
equations in each asset cluster are augmented with variables for all asset shares from the respective other
cluster, and the shares are tested for signiﬁcance. Many of the shares are found insigniﬁcant here at the
lower stage of the 2SBM, providing evidence for separability, while only some shares are found signiﬁcant.
The assumption of separability shall nevertheless be kept up here for estimation purposes regarding the
discrete asset choice, see Section 4.
9Asset Accumulations in a Structural Demand System
Asset demand shall be modeled in an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) from Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980a) allowing for interdependencies between demand for the various types of
assets.19 The AIDS is ﬂexible concerning the factors of inﬂuence on the portfolio decision and
is applied here in an extended version, which is more ﬂexible regarding budget (or income)
eﬀects, the quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS), where demand is a quadratic
function of the log-budget (Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel, 1997).
In each cluster, asset shares are deﬁned with respect to the total cluster budget. There
are three cluster budgets deﬁned here: total housing assets, total ﬁnancial assets, and total
assets disposable. Thus, the share invested in, e.g. ﬁnancial assets is related to total assets
disposable and the share allocated to bonds is related to total ﬁnancial assets: sfin = Afin=A,
and sbonds = Abon=Afin. Let sij denote the share from the respective budget that household i
decided to invest in asset j. Then asset demand in the QUAIDS is generally represented by
the following system of j = 1;:::;J equations, where J denotes the number of all asset types
available to the household:





for households i = 1;:::;N and assets j = 1;:::;J and clusters l = 1;:::;L. Ail is household
i’s budget for cluster l (which is constant for all assets within cluster l), pik is the price of asset
k for household i, and 0j is an asset-speciﬁc constant. 1j and 2j denote parameters of the
budget eﬀects and jk a parameter of the eﬀects of relative price changes. ln(P ) is the translog
price index, which can generally be approximated by a linear price index, e.g. by the log-linear
Laspeyres index (ln(P ) =
P
j  sj ln( pj)), resulting in the linearized QUAIDS.
The demand system in Eq.(4) is linear in the budget parameters and linear in the price pa-
rameters. It imposes the following across-equations constraints on the parameters:
PJ
j 0j = 1;
PJ
j 1j = 0;
PJ
j 2j = 0;
PJ
j jk = 0. These restrictions together imply adding-up of the bud-
get shares to one,
PJ
j b sij = 1 8i = 1;:::;N.20 While adding-up is fulﬁlled by deﬁnition of the
system, other properties of the compensated demand function that make a system consistent
with demand theory can be imposed or tested for the QUAIDS: compensated own price elas-
ticities shall be non-positive ("c
jj  0 8j = 1;:::;J), the Slutsky-matrix is symmetric if the
19Lang (1998) also embeds asset demand in the AIDS framework. Zietz and Weichert (1988) e.g. model asset
demand in a complete structural demand system of the AIDS style. For a theoretical argumentation how
the consumer commodity demand theory can be applied to asset demand, see Sandmo (1977).
20Adding-up of the predicted shares can though not be tested, given adding-up of observed shares by construc-
tion (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a, p. 316).
10cross-price eﬀects coincide, jk = kj 8j;k = 1;:::;J, and compensated demand is homoge-
neous of degree zero in prices if the within-equation constraints,
PJ
k jk = 0 8j = 1;:::;J, hold
(see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b).
The price for asset j shall generally be modeled as a function of the expected net real rate












expected gross return to asset j for household i, tij is household i’s marginal tax rate on
capital income from asset j, and i is the inﬂation rate relevant for household i. The expected
gross return is assumed to equal the actual gross return.21 Generally, gross returns may vary
over asset types and over households. This heterogeneity between households is however not




j ; 8 j. Using
quarterly data on two cross-sections, there is not much variation in gross returns observed to
identify price eﬀects, while controlling for seasonal eﬀects. Thus, the identiﬁcation strategy
here relies on additional variation in the MTR resulting from between-household variation in
the structure of taxable income and in the structure of capital income. As a consequence, the
price eﬀects are estimated as compound eﬀects of net real returns to assets. This implies the
assumption that the relevant returns for the asset allocation decision are net real returns.22





j (1   tij)   i
 1 (5)
By the linearized QUAIDS, the budget elasticity for demand levels is non-constant in the












where Aij is demand for asset j in levels, and Ail is the budget of the relevant cluster l. From
adding-up, it follows that the weighted budget elasticities sum up to one (
PJ
j  sij ij = 1).








=  jk + jk=sij   (1j + 22j ln(Ail=P
))  sk=sij (7)
where  sk is the average share of asset k and jk is the Kronecker delta, i.e. jk = 1 if j = k and
21Alternatively, expectations could be modeled in an autoregressive process here and the one-period-ahead
prediction be applied for the expected return. This shall be implemented in future research.
22Grimes, Wong, and Meads (1994) argue that the speciﬁcation of the ﬁnancial portfolio share model that is
consistent with the AIDS is a function of the real interest rate, as also the budget is denoted in real terms.





ijk + sikij =  jk + jk=sij + sik + (1j + 22j ln(Ail=P
)) (sik    sk)=sij (8)
For the sake of interpretation, also rate-of-return elasticities for the levels will be derived. They














j (1   tij)    is the net real rate of return to asset j. And accordingly, the








1 + ~ rnet
j
(10)
Results on estimated compensated and uncompensated rate-of-return elasticities for asset de-
mand levels will be presented in Section 6.1.
A Reduced-Form Model for the Tax Rate
For most of the assets considered here, the actual functional relation between the price of the
speciﬁc asset and the marginal tax rate is not as simple as in the general deﬁnition in Eq.(5).
Various tax-exempt allowances, tax-credits, deductible expenses, and subsidizing allowances
in the German income tax law make this relation highly complex. This complexity is partly
implemented in the functional form of the asset prices when the model is brought to the data, see
Section 5 for the exact deﬁnition of each asset price in the context of the tax schedule. However,
as the hypothesis to test in this analysis shall be whether households facing a relatively higher
MTR allocate a greater fraction of disposable assets to tax-privileged assets than households
with a relatively lower MTR, the complexity of the asset price function shall be reduced.
For this reduced-form model, which shall be estimated in addition to the structural model
in Eq.(4), it is assumed that the eﬀects of gross returns are invariant over the assets. For






. For r(1   ti)   i close to zero, the log-price can be approximated
by:
ln(pi)   (r(1   ti)   i) (11)
where r(1   ti)   i is the net real return to assets for household i. For the aggregate price
index, P, the average interest rate on domestic bonds for the respective year is applied. The
12demand equations in Eq.(4) then only contain a single asset-invariant price and simplify to:
sij = 0j + 1j ln( e Ail) + 2j ln( e Ail)
2 + jj ln(pi) (12)
where the variables and parameters are deﬁned as in Eq.(4) and ln(pi) is deﬁned in Eq.(11).
While adding-up still holds for this reduced-form demand system, homogeneity as well as
symmetry in prices can not be imposed, as cross-price elasticities are not deﬁned for this model
with an asset-invariant price.
Estimated tax eﬀects will be interpreted w.r.t. the asset shares. The budget elasticity for the











From adding-up, it follows that demand is homogeneous in the budget (
PJ
j 1j = 0;
PJ
j 2j = 0)
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1j + 22j ln(Ail=P ))=sij
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Results on estimated uncompensated own-price elasticities will be used in Sections 6.2 and
6.3 to derive direct and unconditional tax eﬀects. The next section deals with the empirical
strategy for the estimation of the tax eﬀects.
4 Empirical Strategy
Although the risk-minimizing strategy from portfolio theory for risk averse agents clearly ad-
vocates for perfect diversiﬁcation (Auerbach and King, 1983), households are usually observed
holding rather incomplete portfolios. Instead of allocating assets to the maximum number
of asset types available, their portfolios are often limited to a subset of asset types.23 Thus,
the decision of asset allocation shall be separated into the decision whether to buy an asset
(the discrete asset choice) and the decision how much of this asset to demand conditional on
buying it at all (the continuous asset choice). The econometric model for estimating these two
decisions must consider both, the probability of accumulating an asset as well as the share
of total assets allocated to an asset conditional on accumulating it at all. Thereat, it must
be accounted for that the demand probability and the conditional demand for an asset are
23Various arguments for incomplete portfolios can be found in the literature, e.g. diﬀerential tax treatment
altering relative prices of assets (e.g. Feldstein, 1976), ﬁxed or unique transaction costs, monitoring costs
(inter alia Perraudin and Sørensen, 2000), borrowing or liquidity constraints (e.g. Auerbach and King, 1983).
13likely to depend on the same observable and unobservable characteristics as well as on the
respective demand probabilities and conditional demand for all other assets available. These
cross-equation correlations need to be accounted for in the estimation approach.
Estimating such an entire system of equations considering all possible cross-equation re-
strictions in full-information maximum likelihood estimation becomes computationally very
challenging already with four assets. Thus, a two-step approach shall be applied here with sep-
arate models for the discrete and the continuous choice and with correction for selection at the
continuous choice à la Heckman (1979), though applied to multinomial selection.24 Generally,
asset demand shall be divided into the following system of equations for the discrete and the


















sij = aij s

ij (18)
for households i = 1;:::;N and assets j = 1;:::;J, where a
ij and s
ij are the latent propensity
to buy asset j and latent demand for asset j, respectively, and aij and sij are the corresponding
observed variables. ij is an i.i.d. error term and ij an error term with generalized extreme
value distribution. xi is a vector of explanatory variables to be speciﬁed later on, and j
and j are coeﬃcients to be estimated. Eq.(17) together with Eq.(16) mirrors the discrete
asset choice, and Eq.(18) together with Eq.(15) represents the continuous asset choice. In
the ﬁrst step, the discrete asset choice is estimated taking into account dependencies between
the probabilities of buying the various assets in a multinomial setting. In the second step,
the conditional demand for the various assets is estimated in a demand system accounting for
selection from the discrete choice.
Both, the structural model in Eq.(4) and the reduced-form model in Eq.(12) are estimated.
24Such a two-step approach is common in the portfolio choice literature, see e.g. Poterba and Samwick (2002),
King and Leape (1998), Agell and Edin (1990), or Hubbard (1985), and for earlier work, Uhler and Cragg
(1971), Dicks-Mireaux and King (1983), Ioannides (1992), or Perraudin and Sørensen (2000). An alternative
approach that accounts for the simultaneity of the discrete and the continuous asset choice would be a
multivariate tobit model. Amemiya, Saito, and Shimono (1993) apply a multivariate tobit approach and
compare it to a two-step approach. Lang (1998) estimates univariate tobit models. This approach however
assumes that eﬀects are identical for the discrete and the continuous choice, which is why the two-step
approach is preferred here to the multivariate tobit approach. One argument that certainly contradicts this
assumption is the presence of ﬁxed transaction costs associated with accumulating an asset for the ﬁrst time
which are relevant at the discrete choice but not at the continuous choice once the asset is owned.
14For the estimation of the reduced-form model, the two-step selection correction approach is
applied. Results on this estimation in Section 6.2 show that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
found for the eﬀects of the marginal tax rate between a speciﬁcation correcting for selection
and one that omits selection correction. It is thus assumed that selection is negligible for price
eﬀects of the structural demand system in Eq.(4), and thus selection correction is omitted in
the estimation there.25
The Discrete Asset Choice
In the context of the discrete asset choice, unconditional probabilities of positive demand for
each asset j = 1;:::;J shall be estimated, which can then be used to generate selection terms
like inverse Mills’ ratios and adjust the continuous choice estimation on the conditional sample.
A popular approach in the literature applies reduced-form univariate probit models separately
to each selection equation.26 However, as Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) show, applying inverse
Mills’ ratios from univariate selection equations to the conditional demand system results in
an inconsistency in the unconditional expectation of the observed demand share.27
Thus, all j discrete choices of buying an asset shall rather be estimated simultaneously in a
multinomial approach here. For that purpose, portfolios of assets are considered, i.e. mutually
exclusive combinations of all available assets. Households pick a speciﬁc portfolio and thereby
select themselves into buyers and non-buyers of each asset. Generally, for J assets, there result
2J regimes, including the null portfolio. By the two-stage structure of the 2SBM, the number
of combinations stays manageable here. The two asset clusters from the upper-stage decision
imply four combinations: portfolio (1 0) stands for housing assets only, (0 1) denotes ﬁnancial
assets only, (0 0) is the null portfolio, and (1 1) represents the portfolio where both assets
are accumulated. At the lower stage, combinations are formed within each cluster: there are
eight combinations of housing assets, e.g. (0 1 1) for non-owner-occupied housing assets and
mortgage repayments, and 64 combinations of ﬁnancial assets, e.g. (0 1 1 0 0 1) for a portfolio
of exclusively building society savings, stocks, and consumer credit repayments. This structure
implies that each household picks exactly three portfolios in the entire 2SBM, one at the upper
stage and one in each of the two clusters at the lower stage.
Each portfolio choice is estimated in a multinomial logit approach (MNL), whereby the
discrete selection equations for each asset in a cluster are treated as a simultaneous decision.
25Selection is found to only slightly aﬀect the tax rate coeﬃcient in the reduced-form for the within-cluster
allocation of housing assets, whereas in the ﬁnancial cluster and at the upper-stage, the tax rate coeﬃcients
do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the speciﬁcation with and respectively without selection.
26See e.g. King and Leape (1998), Agell and Edin (1990), Ioannides (1992), or Poterba and Samwick (2002).
27Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) relate this procedure to Heien and Wessells (1990), who estimate a demand system
in a two-step procedure of a censored regression approach.
15Demand for stocks, e.g., is investigated conditionally on the demand, possibly zero or non-
zero, for any combination of all other ﬁnancial assets.28 Given the structure of the 2SBM, the
three portfolio choices are estimated in two steps, at which the decisions within the clusters
can be considered separately by the weak separability assumption. Firstly, within the clusters,
there is one MNL estimated among the combinations of housing assets and one MNL among
the combinations of ﬁnancial assets,29 each of them conditionally on positive demand in the
respective cluster, so that each MNL is reduced by one alternative (i.e. the null portfolio):30
Ujjl = x
0
l jjl + jjl 8 l 2 fhou;fing (19)
Secondly, among the two clusters at the upper stage, one MNL is estimated for the four
combinations of housing assets and ﬁnancial assets.31
Uj = x
0 j + j (20)
The vector of explanatory variables, xl (respectively x), includes a function of the respective
budget (Ahou, Afin, or Atot), the household’s marginal tax rate, the stock of total net wealth in
quintiles, variables for household composition, demographics related to the household head (age
in groups, education), dummy variables for self-employed heads, for residence in East Germany,
and for the year 2003.32 From the MNLs in Eqs.(19) and (20), conditional probabilities for
the 8+64 = 72 asset combinations within the clusters, b Pjjl ; l 2 ffin;houg, and unconditional
probabilities for the four combinations among the clusters, b Pj, can be predicted.33
28Similar approaches have been undertaken by Uhler and Cragg (1971), Arrondel and Masson (1990), Amemiya
et al. (1993), and by Perraudin and Sørensen (2000).
29For computational reasons, stocks and bonds are aggregated to “equities” for the MNL estimation within the
ﬁnancial cluster. For the generation of selection terms, they are disaggregated again.
30Let for the moment index j denote an asset combination. Later on, it will stand for a single asset again.
31At the upper stage of the 2SBM, the discrete asset choice is estimated unconditionally, including some 10
percent of all households that do not accumulate any assets at all. For these households picking the null
portfolio in all choices, zero is imputed for the log of total budget. For further 0.2 percent of the sample
with positive total accumulations below 1 euro, total budget is replaced by 1 euro.
32Note that disposable household income is not among the x here, as the consumption-savings decision is
considered exogenous. In the MNL, a cluster-speciﬁc, but alternative-invariant set of regressors, xl, implies
alternative-speciﬁc coeﬃcients given the cluster, jjl, see Greene (2003, pp. 725-726), and Cameron and
Trivedi (2005, pp. 507-512).
33Estimating this nested structure of MNLs in two steps resembles a two-step maximum likelihood estimation
(LIML) of a nested logit model (NLM). In the NLM, Eq.(20) is additionally augmented with inclusive values
from the within-cluster MNLs. This is done in Appendix A in order to test for the appropriateness of the
nested structure applied here. The NLM does not rely on the assumption of independence of the outcomes
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) among the clusters, as opposed to the MNL. The results suggest that the
nesting structure is appropriate here. However, for the estimation of unconditional asset demand probabil-
ities at the upper stage, inclusive values are omitted here, as they do not precisely have the interpretation
of within-cluster utility for two clusters if the MNL at the upper stage has four alternatives.
16These predicted probabilities for the combinations are used to generate a term that will be
applied at the continuous asset choice estimation to correct for selection. There are various
approaches of selection correction in the framework of multinomial discrete choice applied in
the literature, see Maddala (1983, pp. 275-278). Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007)
compare some approaches in simulations and conclude that the method proposed by Dubin
and McFadden (1984) is the one that performs best, which is why it shall be applied here.34
The implied selection term is similar to an inverse Mills’ ratio in the style of Heckman (1978),






b Pkjl ln(b Pkjl)
1   b Pkjl
!
+ ln(b Pjjl) (21)
where b Pkjl is the predicted probability of positive demand for asset combination k in cluster l,
conditional on positive demand for cluster l (and respectively it is substituted here by b Pk at the
upper stage of the 2SBM). Aggregating over all 2Jl=2 combinations of an asset in cluster l (as
e.g. in Amemiya et al., 1993), there results one selection term for each asset, see Appendix A for
an example. This term will be applied to correct for selection due to conditional estimation of
the reduced-form demand system at the continuous asset choice. Conditional marginal demand
probabilities for the assets can be derived in a similar manner by aggregating the b Pjjl over the
alternatives for each asset. Together with marginal cluster demand probabilities, unconditional
demand probabilities for the assets, b Pjl, can be calculated, where the index j = 1;:::;J from
now on denotes a single asset again. Details are relegated to Appendix A.
The Continuous Asset Choice
In the second step of the estimation, the focus is on the continuous asset choice in Eqs.(15) and
(18), i.e. the decision which share of the budget to allocate to an asset type conditional on posi-
tive demand for the respective asset cluster. In order to account for cross-equation correlations
due to spillover eﬀects of demand for one asset on all other assets, conditional asset demand
is estimated in a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) by feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS), see Zellner (1962), correcting for selection into positive cluster demand from
the discrete asset choice. For the estimation of the reduced-form with selection correction,
FGLS estimation in a SUR diﬀers from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation equation-by-
equation, as the selection term from the discrete asset choice diﬀers over the equations and the
34Bourguignon et al. (2007) also ﬁnd that the performance of the Dubin and McFadden (1984) method depends
on the validity of a normalization assumption on the correlations between the errors in the selection and
the outcome equation and propose a variation of this approach which does not have this limitation.
17covariance matrix of the errors in the demand system is not diagonal.35 The demand system
for the estimation of the structural model in Eq.(4) omitting selection is speciﬁed as follows:
sij = 0j + x
0




jk ln(pik) + j (22)
for households i = 1;:::;N and assets j = 1;:::;J in cluster l = 1;:::;L, where sij is the
asset share, e Ail denotes household i’s assets disposable for allocation in cluster l, ln(pik) is
the log-price of asset k as deﬁned in Eq.(5), and j is an i.i.d. error term. xi is a (K  1)
vector of explanatory variables including the stock of total net wealth in quintiles, variables for
household composition, for the age, the education, as well as the social status of the household
head in groups, as well as dummy variables for residence in East Germany, for seasonal eﬀects,
and for the year 2003. 0j is an asset-speciﬁc constant, and j, 1j, 2j, and jk are parameter
vectors.
For the reduced-form estimation of Eq.(12) with selection correction, asset demand is spec-
iﬁed as follows:
sij = 0j + x
0
i j + 1j ln( e Ail) + 2j ln( e Ail)
2 + jj ti + j ijjl + j (23)
where, besides the coeﬃcients and variables from Eq.(22), ti is household i’s marginal tax rate,
ij is the selection term deﬁned in Eq.(21). jj and j are parameter vectors. The household’s
marginal tax rate, ti, enters the demand equations linearly by the approximation of the asset
price in Eq.(11). This implies that the eﬀect of the asset-invariant gross return, r, is swapped
into 0j.36 In order to identify the selection eﬀect, in addition to the non-linear relation between
the ij and the xi, education, which is a control in the discrete choice in Eqs.(19) and (20), is
left out in the reduced-form estimation of the demand equations as an exclusion restriction.37
Moreover, social status is substituted by a dummy variable for self-employed heads in the
reduced-form estimation.
Conditional asset demand in Eqs.(22) and (23) is estimated in three separate demand sys-
35For the estimation of the structural model, where selection is omitted, the FGLS results for the SUR are
identical to the OLS equation-by-equation results. Still, FGLS is preferable since it is as least as eﬃcient
as OLS if all covariates are exogenous and cross-equation hypotheses on parameters, like symmetry of price
eﬀects, can be tested.
36Moreover, interaction eﬀects of the tax rate with other controls were tested. They are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for most of the controls. Only for the budget, the time dummy, and the self-employed
dummy, signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects were found. Still, non of the interactions are signiﬁcant in all demand
equations. Thus, results for the signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects are left as a robustness check.
37The validity of this exclusion restriction can not be tested, but there is evidence in the literature that
education fulﬁlls the necessary conditions here. King and Leape (1998), e.g. , ﬁnd that education aﬀects the
probability of accumulating an asset, while it has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on conditional asset demand.
18tems: one within each of the two clusters and one among the clusters. As demand is conditional,
each system is estimated only with observations that report positive cluster demand. By the
adding-up restrictions from the QUAIDS demand system,
PJ
j sij = 1, it follows that only
J   1 equations can be estimated in order to obtain non-singularity of the error covariance
matrix. The results are invariant to the equation omitted if the system is estimated by maxi-
mum likelihood and if the regressors are equal over the equations. The latter is not the case in
the reduced-form estimation, where the selection term diﬀers over the equations. In this case,
all J equations can though be estimated by iterated FGLS, which converges to the maximum
likelihood estimates. For the estimation of the structural model, adding-up of predicted asset
shares is guaranteed by deﬁnition of the QUAIDS. These systems are estimated either impos-
ing the theoretical constraints of homogeneity and symmetry, or omitting the constraints.38
In Section 6, results from iterated FGLS estimation are presented. Standard errors stem from
maximum likelihood estimation and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Asset shares are predicted
conditional on positive demand for the asset cluster l (b sjjl) and the b jj are used to derive tax
eﬀects on the conditional as well as the unconditional shares.
Another econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the budget, Al, in Eqs.(22) and
(23). In a decision to e.g. allocate ﬁnancial assets between stocks and bonds, the budget for
ﬁnancial assets is likely itself a function of the demand for stocks and bonds. This endogeneity
is usually dealt with in the literature by instrumental variables estimation, see e.g. Banks et al.
(1997), or Hochguertel et al. (1997), or Lang (1998). The potentially endogenous budget is
commonly instrumented by the respective “pre-stage” budget. That is, total assets disposable
at the upper stage of the 2SBM is instrumented with disposable income (or here net savings),
and at the lower stage, the housing budget and the ﬁnancial budget are instrumented with
total assets disposable from the upper stage. In the approach applied here, this endogeneity of
the budget should already be mitigated by two factors. Firstly, by the selection correction, the
decision to allocate ﬁnancial assets between stocks and bonds is already adjusted for the decision
to demand any ﬁnancial assets at all. Secondly, asset demand is speciﬁed in Eqs.(22) and (23)
as asset shares, where the budget appears in the denominator of the dependent variable, as
opposed to other studies, where (log) asset levels are analyzed. For the reduced-form estimation,
the instrumental variables approach is conducted here on the conditional subsample of positive
asset demand, instrumenting the budget with the respective pre-cluster budget and omitting
the selection correction from the discrete asset choice. Results are presented in Section 6.2 and
do not diﬀer much from the main approach, where the budget in not instrumented.
38However, as mentioned in Section 3, for the reduced-form model, homogeneity and symmetry can not be
imposed. Rather the adding-up constraints
PJ
j b j = 0, and
PJ
j b 0j = 1 are imposed. These constraints
guarantee that adding-up holds approximately for the reduced-form estimation.
19Identiﬁcation of the Tax Eﬀects
As already mentioned in Section 3, the eﬀects of diﬀerential income taxation on the structure
of asset demand shall be measured by the household’s marginal tax rate on income. As the
marginal tax rate is not reported in the data, it is simulated in a module for capital income
taxation. In order to identify tax eﬀects in asset demand equations of the form in Eq.(12), the
marginal tax rate applied should be exogenous to the asset allocation decision under analysis.39
Taxable income for each household is thus simulated on the basis of only exogenous capital
income and any income from other sources that is assumed exogenous here.40 Capital income
that accrues at the time when the asset allocation decision is taken (and is thus observed) can
be assumed exogenous here, as it is related to the stock of capital as well as to asset sales, which
are itself considered exogenous, see Section 3. It is further assumed that endogenous capital
income, i.e. income that is related to the decision of asset accumulations, is not observed at the
time of the decision, as it typically accrues in the future.41
Based on the simulated taxable income, a marginal tax rate is derived for each household
member who is considered relevant for the allocation decision, by incrementing taxable income
and assuming the increment is fully taxable and is not accompanied by any deductible expenses.
Then, the individual marginal tax rates are aggregated to a household marginal tax rate (MTR).
There results one MTR on income in general for each household, which is assumed relevant
for the household’s asset allocation decision, also see Appendix B for details. Table B.2 in
Appendix B displays some descriptive statistics on the generated MTR.
Although, the MTR on income is asset-invariant for the decision of marginal asset demand,
there results between-household variation in the MTR from diﬀerential taxation of prior allo-
cation decisions. On the one hand, for a given level of taxable income, the MTR varies with the
structure of taxable income w.r.t. capital income and labor income.42 On the other hand, for a
given level of capital income, the MTR varies with the structure of exogenous capital income
w.r.t. the asset types, as the rules of diﬀerential taxation of capital income from the various
39The marginal tax is a (non-linear) function of taxable income. If taxable income includes capital income and
the latter depends on the asset allocation decision, then the marginal tax rate is in turn a function of the
asset allocation decision and is not exogenous in an equation where asset allocation is to be explained.
40See Feldstein (1976), Agell and Edin (1990) or Poterba and Samwick (2002) for similar approaches of adjusting
taxable income in order to account for potential endogeneity of capital income in portfolio choices.
41This assumption appears plausible given that there usually is a time lag between investments and the ﬂow
of returns and that revolving assets are excluded from analysis here.
42Since asset demand is modeled here as a function of several socio-demographic characteristics that are also
highly correlated with the MTR, as e.g. age of household head and household composition, the identiﬁcation
of the tax eﬀects on asset demand relies on this variation. As a support for the relevance of this variation,
in a regression of the MTR on the ratio of capital income to gross household income, controlling for all
other variables that are included in the asset demand equations, the coeﬃcient for this ratio is found highly
signiﬁcant (t-statistic of 19.7).
20sources of asset types is modeled in detail in the income taxation module, see Appendix B.
Additional variation in the MTR over time from the ﬁrst implementations of a major income
tax reform in the years of 2000/2001 is exploited here to identify the tax eﬀects.
This variation in the MTR becomes apparent from Table B.2 in Appendix B when comparing
the mean MTR in the tax brackets and the maximum MTR over all brackets for the two years.
The income tax tariﬀ was generally shifted downwards. Moreover, the taxation of dividends
was changed, tax allowances for owner-occupied housing were adjusted, and the time frames
for the tax-exemption of price arbitrage sales were altered, see Appendix B for details. In the
next section, the data set and descriptive statistics on asset portfolios are presented.
5 Data and Household Asset Portfolios
Data
The data applied in this analysis stem from the Income and Consumption Survey for Germany
(Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS). The EVS is maintained by the German Fed-
eral Statistical Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt, StaBu). Households are recruited voluntarily
for reports every ﬁve years, according to stratiﬁed quota samples from Germany’s current pop-
ulation survey (Mikrozensus). They are aggregated to the population according to a marginal
distribution of demographic variables. The entire population covered by the EVS is restricted,
as there are groups that are not covered: institutionalized people (i.e. military people in caserns,
students in dormitories, elderly and disabled people in nursery homes or hospitals, nurses or
migrant workers in residences, people in jails), homeless people, and households with monthly
net household income greater than 35,000 DM for 1998 (18,000 euros for 2003). For the two
cross sections applied here, the scientiﬁc use ﬁles contain 49,720 households for the year 1998
and 42,420 for 2003. For details on how the data set has been manipulated, see Appendix C.1.
For gross returns to assets, generally quarterly averages of aggregate monthly consumer
price and interest rate data are applied. Generally, gross returns are reduced by the marginal
tax payment in case the respective capital income is taxable for the household. In order to
determine whether capital income is taxable for the household, the income taxation module is
applied, see Appendix B. The amounts of tax-free allowances granted on e.g. ﬁnancial assets is
reduced according to the by assumption exogenous stock of asset holdings and reported capital
income from these holdings. Gross returns to ﬁnancial assets are assumed taxable for the
household only if the tax-free allowance is already fully exploited, otherwise gross returns equal
net returns. Net returns are reduced by inﬂation (measured by diﬀerences in the quarterly
consumer price indices, diﬀerentiated by federal states) to obtain net real rates of return. For
21details on the proxies for gross returns in case of the various assets, see Appendix C.2.
Household Asset Portfolios
Asset accumulations in the pooled sample are compiled in Table 1. Average probabilities of
positive demand as well as average shares conditional on the population with positive demand
in the respective cluster, weighted by population weights and broken down by tax brack-
ets, are presented. In the ﬁrst column of the upper panel, the average demand probability
(Pj = Pr(aj > 0)) over all tax brackets (“Total”) is displayed. Almost 90% of the households
in the population report positive expenditures for any assets. While about 88% accumulate
ﬁnancial assets, only about 27% demand housing assets. The probability of buying a house
for owner-occupational purposes is more than twice as great (6%) as the probability of buying
one for rental purposes (3%). About 22% of all households repay mortgage loans. Among
ﬁnancial assets, bank deposits (56%) as well as capital insurances (48%) occur most frequently
in portfolios, followed by building society deposits (33%) and consumer credits (26%). Stocks
are demanded by some 12% and bonds by less than 2% of the population.
The structure of conditional asset demand ( sjjl), presented in the lower panel of Table 1, is
dominated by ﬁnancial assets at the upper stage. Among households with positive expenditures
for any assets, the average share of ﬁnancial assets from total assets disposable (second column)
is 87% and of housing assets 13%. In the population with positive demand for housing assets,
the average share of mortgage repayments is 77%, the share of owner-occupied housing 17%,
and the share of non-owner-occupied housing only 6%. Among the ﬁnancial assets, the greatest
average share is accumulated in bank deposits (48%). The average share of capital insurances
is 20%, followed by building society deposits (14%), consumer credit repayments (11%), stocks
(6%), and bonds (1%). These are average demand shares ( sjjl), whereas the ﬁrst column of
Table 1 displays aggregate demand related to aggregate cluster budget (  Aj=  Al). The latter is
greater than the former in case the distribution of shares is highly skewed as it is the case here
e.g. for housing assets. Of all housing assets, only 35% are related to mortgage repayments
(whereas  sjjl is 77%), 42% are invested in owner-occupied houses ( sjjl = 17%), and 23% in
rented houses ( sjjl = 6%). Conditional asset shares are compared to unconditional shares in
Table C.1 in Appendix C.3.
Breaking down average shares by tax brackets in the following columns of Table 1, it becomes
apparent that the demand probability is steadily increasing in the MTR for most of the assets,
except for building society deposits and consumer credits.43 The increase is especially great for
43As the MTR is a non-linear function of income, this reﬂects a correlation between income and portfolio
diversity. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) ﬁnd such evidence for diversiﬁcation of stock portfolios.
22Table 1: Asset Demand by Marginal Tax Rate
Tax Brackets
in percent Total 0 0-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 >45
Demand Probability (Pj)
Total assets disposable 89.8 79.7 88.0 93.6 94.9 97.0 98.2 98.5 98.7
Housing assets 26.9 11.0 20.0 29.5 33.3 38.0 46.9 52.7 60.9
Financial assets 88.1 77.7 86.5 92.0 93.3 95.7 96.5 96.6 96.7
Housing Assets:
Own.-occ. housing 6.3 4.3 5.1 7.3 7.4 7.2 8.0 9.7 9.9
Non-own.occ. housing 2.5 1.0 1.8 2.4 2.5 3.1 4.9 7.1 11.9
Mortgage repayments 22.3 6.8 15.8 24.2 28.4 33.7 42.1 47.3 54.6
Financial Assets:
Bank deposits 55.5 52.1 49.2 55.6 55.7 59.5 64.2 65.6 64.3
Building-society deposits 32.8 16.4 28.5 38.6 43.3 47.8 42.1 36.6 32.2
Stocks 12.4 4.5 8.4 11.5 13.5 19.7 25.5 31.0 35.6
Bonds 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.1 3.1 3.5 5.1
Life, prv.-pension insurances 47.9 29.5 47.3 53.8 58.0 60.4 61.6 61.4 64.1
Consumer credit repayments 25.5 13.3 30.0 28.9 31.6 34.6 32.9 32.4 29.2
Conditional Shares ( sjjl)  Aj=  Al  sjjl
Total assets disposable 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Housing assets 30.2 13.2 7.1 10.3 13.1 15.4 16.8 20.1 21.0 24.7
Financial assets 69.8 86.8 92.9 89.7 86.9 84.6 83.2 79.9 79.0 75.3
Housing Assets:
Own.-occ. housing 41.9 17.0 35.0 19.4 17.9 15.5 12.2 10.7 10.6 9.3
Non-own.occ. housing 22.7 6.0 7.5 6.3 5.7 4.9 5.1 6.0 7.3 11.0
Mortgage repayments 35.4 77.1 57.5 74.3 76.4 79.5 82.7 83.3 82.1 79.7
Financial Assets:
Bank deposits 56.4 47.7 57.5 42.6 45.0 42.1 42.5 46.8 48.2 46.7
Building-society deposits 10.6 14.2 11.2 13.4 15.5 17.2 17.1 12.5 10.0 7.4
Stocks 14.5 5.9 3.7 4.3 5.0 5.5 7.4 9.8 12.6 16.8
Bonds 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.0 2.3
Life, prv.-pension insurances 9.8 20.1 17.8 22.8 21.9 21.9 19.6 19.5 19.7 20.5
Consumer credit repayments 6.3 11.4 9.1 16.4 11.9 12.6 12.7 10.3 8.5 6.3
Unconditional:
N (unweighted) 91,904 91,904 21,945 5,959 8,483 22,499 20,736 6,918 2,964 2,400
N (weighted, in 000s) 74,303 74,303 25,478 5,363 7,216 16,486 12,495 3,980 1,688 1,597
Notes:  Aj=  Al is the ratio of aggregate demand to aggregate budget, while  sjjl is the average demand share. Conditional shares
refer to the subpopulation with positive demand in the corresponding asset cluster. Data weighted by population weights.
Reading example: In the population, 26.9% of all households demand any housing assets, 6.3% owner-occupied housing, 2.5%
non-owner-occupied housing, and 22.3% mortgage repayments. Among households with demand for any assets, the average share
of housing assets is 13.2%. Among households with demand for housing assets, the average share of owner-occupied housing is
17.0%. However, aggregate demand for the latter related to aggregate demand for housing assets is much greater (41.9%).
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
housing assets in general, where the probability increases from 11% in the lowest tax bracket
to over 60% in the highest bracket, for mortgages (from 7% to 55%), and for stocks (from 5%
to 36%). For building society deposits as well as for consumer credits, the greatest demand
23probabilities occur in mid-level brackets. Variation in asset demand by the MTR can also be
found in the structure of conditional asset demand. As the average conditional share ( sjjl) of
housing assets steadily increases from 7% in the lowest tax bracket to almost 25% in the highest,
the share of ﬁnancial assets decreases accordingly. Among housing assets, owner-occupied
housing dominates rented housing (35% compared to 8%) in the lowest bracket, whereas in the
highest bracket, this relation is turned around (9% compared to 11%). Mortgage repayments
have a greater share in the highest bracket (80%) than in the lowest (58%). Among the ﬁnancial
assets, there is an increasing relevance of stocks and bonds over the tax brackets, while building
society deposits and consumer credits are rather hump-shaped with a peak in the mid-level
brackets. For bank deposits as well as for capital insurances, there is no clear descriptive
pattern apparent, their conditional shares are relatively constant over the tax brackets. This
descriptive variation in asset demand over the tax brackets may though be overlaid by other
eﬀects, such as e.g. age eﬀects, budget eﬀects, or wealth eﬀects. The focus of the next section
shall be on the estimation results, where other relevant eﬀects are controlled.
6 Results
Asset demand has been estimated in two models, the structural demand system as speciﬁed in
Eq.(22) and the reduced-form model as speciﬁed in Eq.(23). In this section, ﬁrst of all, results
for the structural demand system are presented. Budget and rate-of-return elasticities are de-
rived and interpreted w.r.t. relative price eﬀects and resulting substitutive and complementary
relations between the assets. Then, tax eﬀects from the estimation of the reduced-form model
are presented. Since asset demand is estimated conditional on positive cluster asset demand,
the resulting tax eﬀects are to be interpreted on conditional demand (in the following: condi-
tional tax eﬀects), i.e. for a ﬁxed cluster budget. Considering additional tax eﬀects on cluster
asset demand, unconditional tax eﬀects are derived (in the following: unconditional tax eﬀects).
6.1 Rate-of-Return Eﬀects in the Structural Model
Results for elasticities from the estimation of the structural demand system in Eq.(22) are
compiled in Appendix D.1 in Table D.1 for the upper stage and in Tables D.2 and D.3 for
the lower stage. Conditional budget and rate-of-return elasticities are presented for both,
the unconstrained estimation of the three demand systems, and the respective constrained
estimation, where in all systems the estimation is constrained simultaneously for homogeneity
and symmetry.
For all three demand systems, the theoretical constraints of homogeneity and symmetry can
24be rejected. As Table A.1 in Appendix A shows, homogeneity is rejected at the 10%-level for
ﬁve of all eight equations at the two stages, though only for three equations at the 5%-level. In
simultaneous tests for all equations of a system, homogeneity is rejected at the 10%-level for
the housing cluster (2
2 = 5:2), at the 5%-level for the ﬁrst-stage (2
1 = 6:0), and at the 1%-level
for the ﬁnancial cluster (2
5 = 20:2). Symmetry is rejected at the 5%-level for nine of the eleven
constraints taking all systems together. It is also clearly rejected in simultaneous tests for all
ten constraints in the ﬁnancial system (2
10 = 405:3). Thus, the results from the unconstrained
estimation shall be applied here in the following to derive elasticities. Detailed results from
the unconstrained demand system estimations are given in Appendix D.2, in Table D.5 for the
upper stage, and in Tables D.6 as well as D.7 for the lower stage.
At the upper stage of the 2SBM, the allocation decision is conditioned on positive demand for
total assets disposable. Thus, additional price and budget eﬀects from the consumption-savings
decision on the asset allocation decision shall be considered. If a general interest-rate increase
induces households to shift current income from consumption to savings, then additional assets
are disposable for allocation to ﬁnancial and housing assets. These eﬀects are estimated in
Beznoska and Ochmann (2010) for the budget elasticity of savings (w.r.t. current income) to
sav = 1:84, for the uncompensated interest rate elasticity of savings to "
(r)u
sav = 0:11, and for
the respective compensated elasticity to "
(r)c
sav = 0:55.44
The resulting unconditional elasticities for asset demand levels considering the eﬀects from
the consumption-savings decision together with the eﬀects from the two-stage structure of
the 2SBM can be derived following Edgerton (1997) and Carpentier and Guyomard (2001),
omitting household indices for simplicity here. The unconditional budget elasticity for asset j
in cluster l corresponds to:
j = jjl  l  sav (24)
The unconditional uncompensated rate-of-return elasticity for asset j in cluster l follows from:
"
(r)u
jk = lm "
(r)u













where lm is the Kronecker delta, which is equal to one for identical clusters, l = m, and zero
otherwise, "
(r)u
jkjl is the uncompensated elasticity for asset j conditional on cluster l w.r.t. the
rate of return to asset k, jjl is the conditional budget elasticity for asset j in cluster l,
 skjm = E[sk jam > 0] is the mean conditional budget share of asset k in cluster m, "
(r)u
lm is




sav are actually the estimated elasticities w.r.t. a change in the
savings price. In this intertemporal consumption decision, a long-term interest rate eﬀect aﬀects all future
periods through the discount factor. If the eﬀect is assumed to last approximately (1 + r)=r periods ( 50,
for r = 0:02), the interest rate elasticity of savings is approximately equal to the price elasticity of savings.
25the uncompensated elasticity of cluster l assets w.r.t. the rate of return to cluster m, j is de-
ﬁned in Eq.(24),  sk is the mean unconditional share of asset k from total assets, and "
(r)u
sav is the
uncompensated interest rate elasticity of savings. The respective compensated rate-of-return
elasticity for asset j in cluster l follows from:
"
(r)c
jk = lm "
(r)c
jkjl + jjl  skjm "
(r)c







lm are the respective conditional compensated rate-of-return elasticities of
asset j and cluster asset l and "
(r)c
sav is the compensated interest rate elasticity of savings.
Conditional budget and rate-of-return elasticities are deﬁned for the asset levels in the QUAIDS
in Eqs.(6), (9), and (10).
Table D.4 in Appendix D.1 compiles the results for the unconditional budget and rate-of-
return elasticities from the unconstrained demand system estimations of Eq.(22). The ﬁrst
panel of Table D.4 presents the estimated unconditional budget elasticities for all assets, the
second panel shows unconditional uncompensated rate-of-return elasticities, and the third panel
displays the respective compensated rate-of-return elasticities. The budget elasticity is esti-
mated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one at the 1%-level for all assets. It is signiﬁcantly greater
than one for all assets, except for insurances, indicating that all assets are luxuries, except for
insurances, which are necessities. These unconditional budget elasticities result from an income
elasticity for savings of 1.84 in conjunction with a budget elasticity for housing assets of 1.20
and for ﬁnancial assets of 0.96, according to Eq.(24).
Moreover, it can be seen that demand for almost all assets is theoretically consistent con-
cerning non-positive compensated own-price elasticities, as this restriction translates into non-
negative compensated rate-of-return elasticities. Demand increases for almost all assets if the
own rate of return increases. Only for bonds, the compensated own-rate elasticity is not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and for stocks it is slightly negative. Furthermore, demand is
elastic w.r.t. the own rate of return for owner-occupied housing (b "
(r)u
jj =1.13), for non-owner oc-
cupied housing (1.20), for mortgages (1.40), for bank deposits (1.18), and for insurances (1.27).
This results from an uncompensated own-rate elasticity for housing assets in general of 0.56
and a relatively smaller respective own-rate elasticity for ﬁnancial assets of 0.09 (Table D.1).
Demand is inelastic w.r.t. own rates for building society savings (0.38), for stocks (-0.16), for
bonds (-0.57), and for consumer credit repayments (0.80).
W.r.t. cross-rates, on the one hand, most of the assets are found to be substitutes, as negative
uncompensated cross-rate elasticities in the second panel of Table D.4 indicate, though not all
of them are signiﬁcantly smaller than zero. On the other hand, there are also complementary
relations found between some assets. In addition, as symmetry is rejected for most of the
26relations, eﬀects are ambiguous in some cases. Generally, it appears that cross-rate eﬀects
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the ﬁnancial asset equations, whereas most of them are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the housing asset equations. Only the rates for owner-
occupied housing and for mortgage repayments are relevant in all demand equations. Some
relatively greater eﬀects shall be interpreted in the following. Most of the other substitutive
and complementary eﬀects are found to be economically relatively small.
If the net rate of return to owner-occupied housing increases by 1%-point from an average
of rnet
own=0.064 to 0.074, households increase unconditional demand for these assets on average
by 18% from a monthly average of 123 euros to 145 euros, and they increase unconditional
demand for non-owner occupied housing assets by 11% from 67 euros to 74 euros as well as
for mortgage repayments by only 1% from 104 euros to 105 euros. These eﬀects are though
not symmetric. If the interest rate on mortgages increases by 1%-point from an average of
rnet
mor=0.046 to 0.056, unconditional demand increases elastically for owner-occupied housing
by 32% from 123 euros to 162 euros and for non-owner occupied housing by 25% from 67
euros to 84 euros. Also demand for mortgage repayments increases elastically by 30% from
104 euros to 135 euros in turn of a 1%-increase in the own rate. These ﬁndings indicate a
complementary relation between housing assets and mortgage repayments. If the returns to
housing assets increase, households take up more mortgages and start repaying them or speed
up the repayment of mortgage holdings. In turn, they reduce demand for all ﬁnancial assets.
If the interest rate on mortgages increases by 1%-point, demand e.g. for stocks is reduced by
2% from 99 euros to 97 euros and for bonds by 3% from 17 euros to 16 euros.
The rate of return to bank deposits only aﬀects other ﬁnancial assets signiﬁcantly. Comple-
mentary relations are found with all other ﬁnancial assets, while the substitutive relations to
housing assets are not signiﬁcant. If the interest rate on bank deposits increases by 0.5%-points
from an average of rnet
dep=0.015 to 0.020, demand for building society savings is increased by
22% from 72 euros to 88 euros, demand for stocks is increased by 49% from 99 euros to 148
euros, and demand for bonds is increased by 60% from 17 euros to 27 euros.
Moreover, substitutive eﬀects between ﬁnancial assets are found e.g. for bonds with stocks,
for bonds with insurances, and for bonds with consumer credits. If the return to bonds increases
by 1%-point from an average of rnet
bon=0.050 to 0.060, demand for stocks is reduced by 14% from
99 euros to 85 euros, demand for insurances is reduced by 15% from 67 euros to 57 euros, and
demand for consumer credit repayments is reduced by 13% from 43 euros to 37 euros.
The elasticities found here for conditional demand are comparable to budget and rate-of-
return elasticities found in the literature. Zietz and Weichert (1988) estimate similar budget
elasticities for bonds (2.00) and bank deposits (between 0.76 and 1.00, where the former relates
to savings deposits and the latter to ﬁxed deposits) compared to conditional elasticities found
27here (see Table D.3 in Appendix D.1). Uncompensated own-rate elasticities are estimated to
between 0.54 and 2.89 for bank deposits, which is greater than found here, and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for bonds, which is found here, too. Most of the relative price eﬀects are
also found not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Taylor and Clements (1983) estimate budget elasticities for bank deposits to between 0.50
and 1.09 (where the former is for savings bank deposits and the latter for ﬁxed deposits), for
building society deposits to between 2.80 and 2.98 (depending on the speciﬁcation), and for
bonds to between 0.28 and 0.39. Uncompensated own-rate elasticities are estimated for bank
deposits to between -0.17 and 1.09, for building society deposits to between 0.47 and 0.66, and
for bonds to between 0.40 and 0.69.
6.2 Conditional Tax Eﬀects
In the following, the focus shall be on the estimated tax eﬀects from the estimation of the
reduced-form model in Eq.(23). The conditional tax eﬀects discussed in the following imply
the eﬀect of a shift in the MTR on the expected conditional asset demand share, where the
condition is on a positive respective budget. Table 2 shows estimated conditional tax eﬀects for
various speciﬁcations, marginal eﬀects of a 10%-points increase in the MTR from the respective
conditional mean45 on conditional asset demand shares (sjjl) are presented. Detailed results
from the reduced-form estimations of the continuous asset choice are given in Appendix D.4,
in Table D.11 for the upper stage, and in Tables D.12 as well as D.13 for the lower stage. The
estimation results for the demand probabilities from the discrete asset choice can be found in
Tables D.8, D.9, and D.10 in Appendix D.3.
The focus here shall ﬁrstly be on the main approach, “SUR + Selection” in the “pooled”
version in Table 2. For this speciﬁcation, the estimated conditional tax eﬀects are statistically
highly signiﬁcant, though economically most of them are not very large. While the eﬀects are
signiﬁcant at an error probability of 0.1% for almost all assets, the size of a 10%-points increase
in the MTR ranges in absolute terms from 0 to less than 5%-points shifts in the conditional
asset shares only.46
Most of the estimated conditional tax eﬀects though point in the directions that one would
expect given the theoretical asset classiﬁcation into relatively more tax-privileged assets, less
tax-privileged assets, and non-privileged assets, see Section 2. Among ﬁnancial assets, there is a
45The unweighted (conditional) mean MTR corresponds to: 22.4% (weighted 18.6%) in the unconditional
sample, 23.3% (19.9%) at the upper stage, 28.1% (26.1%) in the housing cluster, and 23.4% (19.9%) in the
ﬁnancial cluster.
46Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are generated from maximum likelihood esti-
mation, see Tables D.11 - D.13 in Appendix D.4. They can be regarded as a lower limit as they are not
adjusted for the fact that the discrete and the continuous choice have been estimated in two steps.
28Table 2: Conditional Tax Eﬀects on Conditional Asset Demand Shares
in %-points + 10 %-points in MTR
SUR SUR+IV SUR+Selection
 sjjl pooled 1998 03 98 East Self
Housing Assets 16:7 +0:3 +3:5 +0:3  0:1 +1:1  0:8 +1:2
Financial Assets 83:3  0:3  3:5  0:3 +0:1  1:1 +0:8  1:2
Housing Assets:
Owner-Occupied 15:3  4:0  4:5  4:1  4:2 +0:4 +0:2 +1:0
Non-Owner-Occupied 5:7 +0:5 +0:2 +0:4 +0:4 +0:0  0:1  0:9
Mortgages 79:0 +3:5 +4:3 +3:7 +3:8  0:4  0:0  0:1
Financial Assets:
Bank Deposits 45:0  3:4  2:7  3:4  3:3  0:3  0:2 +0:4
Building-Society Dep. 15:7 +0:5 +0:2 +0:5 +0:5  0:1 +0:4  1:5
Stocks 6:8 +0:2z +0:0 +0:2z  0:0 +0:4 +0:4  0:2
Bonds 0:9  0:1  0:1  0:1  0:0  0:0  0:0  0:0
Insurances 20:8 +2:0 +1:8 +2:0 +2:2  0:3  0:2 +0:9
Consumer Credits 10:8 +0:8 +0:8 +0:8 +0:6 +0:3  0:3 +0:4
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: zp < 0:10, *p < 0:05, **p < 0:01, ***p < 0:001, based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors from the SUR system estimations, see Tables D.11 - D.13 in Appendix D.4.  sjjl is the mean unweighted share of asset
j, conditional on a positive budget. East is the diﬀerence in tax eﬀects in East-Germany compared to West-Germany, Self
is the respective diﬀerence for the self-employed compared to others. Conditional tax eﬀects are evaluated for a 10%-points
increase in the MTR from the conditional mean MTR of 23.3% at the upper stage, 28.1% in the housing cluster, and 23.4% in
the ﬁnancial cluster.
Reading example: In the main approach, “SUR + Selection” in the “pooled” version, a 10%-points increase in the MTR from
a conditional mean of 23.3% increases the share of total assets disposable allocated to housing assets, conditional on positive
demand for total assets, by 0.3%-points. Conditional on positive demand for housing assets, the share of which is allocated
to mortgages increases by 3.7%-points in turn of a 10%-points increase in the MTR from a conditional mean of 28.1%. When
the “SUR + Selection” approach is estimated separately for the two cross-sections, the direct tax eﬀect on housing assets is
-0.1%-points for 1998, and it is 1.1%-points greater for 2003 than for 1998. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 0.001%-level.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
relatively strong negative tax eﬀect on bank deposits, which are classiﬁed as non-privileged, and
a relatively strong positive tax eﬀect on insurances, which are classiﬁed as relatively more tax-
privileged. A 10%-points increase in the MTR from a conditional mean of 23.4% decreases the
conditional share of bank deposits by 3.4%-points and raises the conditional share of insurances
by 2.0%-points, from a mean conditional unweighted share ( sjjl) for bank deposits of 45.0% and
for insurances of 20.8%. There are moreover signiﬁcantly positive conditional tax eﬀects found
on building society deposits, on stocks, and on consumer credit repayments, and signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀects on bonds, but these eﬀects are relatively small.
The strongest conditional tax eﬀects are estimated for the conditional allocation of housing
assets to owner-occupied housing, to non-owner occupied housing, and to mortgage repayments.
29A 10%-points increase in the MTR from a conditional mean of 28.1% shifts a share of 4.1%-
points from owner-occupied housing assets ( sjjl = 15:3%) to non-owner occupied housing assets
(+0.4%-points from  sjjl = 5:7%) and to repayments of mortgage loans (+3.7%-points from
 sjjl = 79:0%), for ﬁxed housing assets.47 These eﬀects point in the expected directions given
the classiﬁcation of owner-occupied housing assets as relatively less tax-privileged and the
other two housing assets as more privileged. By the time of 1998 and 2003, tax allowances
on owner-occupied housing were capped by income limitations, while expenses that are related
to income from renting and leasing, e.g. operating and maintenance costs, as well as interest
payments on mortgages for non-owner occupied housing could be deducted also by the high-
income households.
The demand systems have been re-estimated by instrumenting the potentially endogenous
budget with its respective pre-cluster budget (speciﬁcation “SUR + IV” in Table 2), while
neglecting selection correction, based on observations with positive budget only. As instruments
for the upper stage, total assets, net savings, and the employment status of the household head
are applied.48 The results vary a little from the main approach. Eﬀects are stronger for bank
deposits, for owner-occupied housing, and for mortgages. Moreover, at the upper stage, the
eﬀects are much stronger. But it shall be noted here that net savings can be doubted as a
good instrument for total assets and thus, the “SUR + IV” results should be interpreted with
caution here, which is why in the main approach, the budget shall not be instrumented.
As robustness checks for the main approach, other speciﬁcations have been estimated, which
largely conﬁrm the main results. The demand systems have been re-estimated without any
selection correction (speciﬁcation “SUR” in Table 2). As far as the tax eﬀects are concerned,
selection appears to be relevant only in the housing cluster, where the eﬀects diﬀer slightly,
whereas for ﬁnancial assets, there is no evidence for selection eﬀects, as the tax eﬀects do not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the “SUR” and the “SUR+Selection” speciﬁcations.49 Estimating the
demand systems separately for 1998 and 2003 reveals that the conditional tax eﬀects only diﬀer
signiﬁcantly at the upper stage between the years. In 2003, there is a stronger conditional tax
eﬀect on housing assets (+1.1%-points more than in 1998) and ﬁnancial assets (-1.1%-points
accordingly). For all other assets, the eﬀects do not diﬀer between 1998 and 2003, except
slightly for stocks.
The only signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the tax eﬀects between East- and West-Germany (“SUR
47Note that as imposed by the demand model, the estimated tax eﬀects sum to zero for each system.
48Net savings include asset sales that are assumed exogenous to asset demand. The labor supply decision is
also assumed exogenous here, given that the test for separability could not be rejected, see fn. 10.
49This result appears plausible, as at the upper stage, only some 10% of all households select themselves into
demand for no assets, and only slightly more into no demand for ﬁnancial assets, while almost 3=4 of all
households do not demand any housing assets.
30+ Selection”) can be found at the upper stage and for stocks. In East-Germany, the eﬀects
are lower for housing assets (0.8%-points lower) and greater for ﬁnancial assets (0.8%-points
greater) than in West-Germany. Eﬀectively, the results are actually reversed here for these
two asset clusters. Tax eﬀects are moreover slightly greater in East-Germany on stocks. For
all other assets, there are no diﬀerences in the tax eﬀects between the East and the West.
Separate models have also been estimated for households with a self-employed head allowing
for diﬀerent reactions to tax incentives compared to other households due to the presence of
business assets, which are not modeled explicitly as an asset in this analysis. Conditional
tax eﬀects for the self-employed are a little more pronounced for asset demand at the upper
stage, and the self-employed are found to shift an additional 1.5%-points from building society
deposits to insurance assets and to consumer credits, compared to other households.
In yet another speciﬁcation, the estimated demand equations were augmented with inter-
action eﬀects of the MTR with the log-budget and the log-budget squared in order to allow
tax eﬀects to vary with the level of total assets disposable. Figure D.1 in Appendix D.5 plots
estimated conditional tax eﬀects over the distribution of the respective budget. At the upper
stage, tax eﬀects on demand for housing assets are negative for lower deciles, zero for the me-
dian, and positive for the higher deciles; accordingly tax eﬀects on ﬁnancial assets decrease in
the budget. In the housing cluster, conditional tax eﬀects vary with housing budget for the 1st
and the 10th decile. These households face stronger tax eﬀects for owner-occupied housing and
for mortgages. Moreover, tax eﬀects on non-owner occupied housing as well as on insurances
are negative for the 1st decile and then steadily increase in the respective budget. For bank
deposits, tax eﬀects steadily rise from -5.5% in the lowest decile to -1.5% in the highest. For
all other ﬁnancial assets, tax eﬀects continuously decrease in the budget.
6.3 Unconditional Tax Eﬀects
Unconditional tax eﬀects result if the conditional tax eﬀects discussed so far are adjusted for
additional eﬀects on the cluster budget through the two-stage structure of the 2SBM. Following
Edgerton (1997) and Carpentier and Guyomard (2001), Eq.(25) can be applied to derive the
unconditional uncompensated own-price elasticity for asset j in cluster l as:
"j = "jjl + jjl  sjjl (1 + "l) (27)
where "jjl is the conditional uncompensated own-price elasticity for asset j in cluster l, jjl is
the conditional budget elasticity for asset j in cluster l,  sjjl is the mean conditional budget
share of asset j in cluster l, and "l is the unconditional uncompensated own-price elasticity of
cluster l assets. Conditional budget and own-price elasticities are deﬁned for the asset shares
31in the QUAIDS in Eqs.(13) and (14).50
The unconditional uncompensated own-price elasticity (in the following also: tax elasticity)
of cluster l assets ("l) is determined at the upper stage of the 2SBM, which is estimated
conditionally on positive total asset demand so that tax eﬀects occur at the intensive as well as
at the extensive margin. It follows that "l is a function of both, the conditional elasticity and
the elasticity of the probability of positive total asset demand, see Appendix D.5 for details.
The resulting unconditional tax eﬀects for cluster asset demand are presented in Table D.14 in
Appendix D.5. The estimated marginal tax eﬀect on the probability of positive demand for total
assets at the mean of all covariates is very little (MfxPatot): a 10%-points increase in the MTR
from an unconditional mean of 22.4% increases the probability of positive demand for any assets
by 0.01%-points, which is statistically not diﬀerent from zero. Thus, the resulting marginal tax
eﬀects on the unconditional cluster asset share (Mfxsl) do not vary much from the respective
conditional eﬀects (Mfxslja). A 10%-points increase in the MTR increases the unconditional
share of housing assets by 0.28%-points and decreases the unconditional share of ﬁnancial assets
by 0.29%-points. Thus, total asset demand is slightly decreased. The corresponding tax ("l)
and budget (l) elasticities on the unconditional cluster shares are in the following applied to
derive unconditional tax eﬀects on assets at the lower stage.
Table 3 displays the point estimates and standard errors for the elements of Eq.(27). The
conditional tax eﬀects (Mfxcon
sjjl) and the corresponding elasticities on the conditional share
("jjl) are presented in the ﬁrst two columns. These are then adjusted by the conditional
budget elasticity (jjl), the unconditional cluster asset tax elasticity ("l), and weighted by
the conditional asset share ( sjjl), according to Eq.(27).51 There results the unconditional tax
elasticity for the share of asset j, "j. Relating this elasticity either to the conditional share
( sjjl) or to the unconditional share ( sj), gives the unconditional marginal tax eﬀect on the
conditional (Mfxunc
sjjl) and respectively unconditional share (Mfxunc
sj ).
In more detail, budget eﬀects on the shares (jjl) are slightly negative for mortgages as well
as consumer credits, while they are stronger for building society deposits as well as insurances.
These asset shares are thus reduced with increasing budget, while all other asset shares are
increased.52 The resulting unconditional tax elasticities on the shares ("j) do not diﬀer much
50It should though be noted, that the own-price eﬀects do not have a structural interpretation in the reduced-
form model, as the price eﬀect on the budget, e Ail = Ail=P, is neglected. They should rather be interpreted
as empirical tax elasticities. If the eﬀect on the budget was considered, the corresponding compensated
own-price elasticities would follow from the Slutsky equation: "
j = "j + j sjjl, where the unconditional
income eﬀect in the 2SBM is calculated from: j sj = jjl sjjl l sl (Edgerton, 1997).
51Note that the conditional budget elasticities for the shares weighted by the conditional share sum up to zero
for each cluster as a consequence of adding-up:
PJl
j  sjjl jjl = 0.
52All elasticities presented here refer to the asset shares. The corresponding budget elasticities on the levels
follow from: lev
jjl = 1+jjl. They allow the interpretation that owner-occupied housing, non-owner occupied
32Table 3: Budget Eﬀects and Unconditional Tax Eﬀects on (Un-)Conditional Asset Shares
Mfxcon
sjjl "jjl jjl "l "j  sjjl Mfxunc
sjjl  sj Mfxunc
sj
Own.-Occ.  0:411  0:754 0:226 0:040  0:718 15:3  0:391 3:1  0:098
(0:017) (0:030) (0:066) (0:009) (0:032) (13:8) (0:017) (21:6) (0:004)
Non-O.-Occ. 0:039 0:194 0:330 0:040 0:213 5:7 0:043 1:1 0:011
(0:010) (0:049) (0:073) (0:009) (0:049) (7:1) (0:010) (13:2) (0:003)
Mortgages 0:372 0:132  0:068 0:040 0:077 79:0 0:215 12:5 0:043
(0:058) (0:009) (0:023) (0:009) (0:021) (22:2) (0:058) (44:2) (0:012)
Bank Dep.  0:340  0:177 0:291  0:008  0:047 45:0  0:090 40:1  0:084
(0:020) (0:007) (0:017) (0:003) (0:011) (18:2) (0:020) (41:8) (0:019)
Build.-S.D. 0:050 0:075  0:276  0:008 0:032 15:7 0:021 11:9 0:017
(0:010) (0:014) (0:023) (0:003) (0:015) (7:8) (0:010) (26:4) (0:008)
Stocks 0:015z 0:050z 0:478  0:008 0:083 6:8 0:024 5:7 0:021
(0:008) (0:026) (0:057) (0:003) (0:027) (5:2) (0:008) (19:7) (0:007)
Bonds  0:008  0:215 0:909  0:008  0:207 0:9  0:008 0:8  0:007
(0:003) (0:085) (0:202) (0:003) (0:085) (1:1) (0:003) (7:4) (0:003)
Insurances 0:201 0:226  0:537  0:008 0:115 20:8 0:102 15:8 0:081
(0:012) (0:012) (0:034) (0:003) (0:014) (14:3) (0:012) (30:2) (0:010)
Con.Cred. 0:082 0:178  0:150  0:008 0:162 10:8 0:075 9:1 0:065
(0:009) (0:019) (0:061) (0:003) (0:020) (9:3) (0:009) (23:9) (0:008)
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method or standard deviations in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: zp < 0:10,
*p < 0:05, **p < 0:01, ***p < 0:001. Marginal eﬀects are computed at the mean of all covariates. Mfxcon
sjjl
= @E[sj jal]=@t is the
marginal tax eﬀect on asset share j, conditional on the budget in cluster l. "jjl is the corresponding tax elasticity, and jjl the
corresponding budget elasticity, where for t and al conditional means are applied. "l is the unconditional tax elasticity of cluster
asset l. "j is the resulting tax elasticity on the unconditional share of asset j.  sjjl is the (unweighted) share of asset j, conditional
on cluster l budget. Mfxunc
sjjl
is the total marginal tax eﬀect on the conditional share.  sj is the (unweighted) unconditional share
of asset j.
P
j  sj = 93:2 which equals the (unweighted) share of households with positive demand for total assets. Mfxunc
sj is the
resulting total marginal tax eﬀect on the unconditional share.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
from the respective conditional elasticities ("jjl) for owner-occupied housing ("j =  0:72), for
non-owner-occupied housing (0.21), for building society deposits (0.03), for stocks (0.08), for
bonds (-0.21), and for consumer credits (0.16). This is due either to a relatively low budget
elasticity or to a relatively little conditional share, as a result of which unconditional demand is
housing, bank deposits, stocks, and bonds are superior goods (or luxuries, lev
jjl > 1), while all other assets are
relatively inferior goods (or necessities, 0 < lev
jjl < 1). This is also found for the structural demand model,
see Section 6.1. Moreover, in the structural demand system, the uncompensated own-price elasticities for
the levels would follow from "lev
j = "j   1, implying the price eﬀect on the budget. This eﬀect is though
neglected in the reduced-form model, as simple empirical tax elasticities are computed. If assumed the eﬀect
was zero, the compensated own-price elasticities for the levels, following from "lev 
j = "j   1 + jjl  sjjl l  sl
(Edgerton, 1997), would be non-positive for all assets here and thus theoretically consistent with a negative
semideﬁnite Slutsky matrix.
33relatively unaﬀected by budget eﬀects. However, for mortgages ("j = 0:08), for bank deposits (-
0.05), and for insurances (0.12), unconditional elasticities are much lower in absolute terms than
the respective conditional ones. For insurances, this is due to a relatively great budget elasticity
(jjl) that goes in the opposite direction of the tax eﬀect and thus reduces the unconditional
elasticity. For mortgages and for bank deposits, a budget eﬀect in the opposite direction of
the tax eﬀect together with a relatively great conditional share reduces the unconditional tax
eﬀect.
If the unconditional tax elasticity ("j) is related to the conditional asset share ( sjjl), the
resulting marginal tax eﬀects can be interpreted as unconditional tax eﬀects on the conditional
share (Mfxunc
sjjl). These could then be compared to the corresponding conditional tax eﬀects
(Mfxcon
sjjl). It becomes apparent that the unconditional tax eﬀects on the conditional share are
still the greatest in absolute terms for owner-occupied housing (conditional share is reduced
by 3.9%-points if the MTR increases by 10%-points), mortgage repayments (+2.2%-points),
and insurances (+1.0%-points). These results (Mfxunc
sjjl) may then be compared to the relevant
literature, where usually unconditional tax eﬀects on conditional asset shares are evaluated
(Feldstein, 1976; Hubbard, 1985; King and Leape, 1998), also see Section 1. While the results
found here generally ﬁt by size in the range of the results found in this literature (from 1%-
points to 9%-points in absolute terms), they are located rather at the lower end of this bound
for most of the assets.53
Finally, the results for "j shall be related to  sj in order to derive unconditional tax eﬀects for
the unconditional asset share (Mfxunc
sj ). As a result of this interpretation on the unconditional
shares, the resulting eﬀects in the range of 0.1-0.8%-points in absolute terms appear rather
small. Nevertheless, as already the results for "j show, there remain some relatively strong
results. Generally, the main result still holds: the higher the MTR, the greater demand is
for tax-privileged assets and the lower it is for some of the less privileged or not privileged
assets. Demand for relatively more tax-privileged assets is increased: the unconditional share
of non-owner occupied housing assets increases from a mean share of 1.1% from total assets
to 1.2% when the MTR is increased by 10%-points from an unconditional mean of 22.4%.
Mortgage repayments are increased from 12.5% to 12.9%, and capital and private old-age
pension insurance assets from 15.8% to 16.6%. Demand for some less privileged assets is
reduced, for owner-occupied housing greatly from 3.1% to 2.1% and for bonds from 0.8% to
0.7%, while it is increased for other less privileged assets, as for stocks from 5.7% to 5.9%.
53Still, comparability of the results with the tax eﬀects found in this literature is limited for two reasons.
Firstly, in the literature, the condition for conditional shares is on positive demand for the asset, not the
asset cluster as it is the case here. Secondly, the comparability of the asset types is limited, as the underlying
tax incentives may diﬀer for the various tax systems.
34Demand for assets that are not privileged in the tax system is ambiguous: while it is reduced
for bank deposits, from 40.1% to 39.3%, it is increased for consumer credit repayments, from
9.1% to 9.8%, and for building society deposits, from 11.9% to 12.1%.
All unconditional tax eﬀects have been evaluated for an average household, with an average
conditional MTR. The eﬀects may though vary over the distribution of the MTR, as the
probability of asset demand is modeled as a non-linear function of the MTR and conditional
asset demand is a non-linear function of the probability by the selection correction. Figure D.2
in Appendix D.5 reveals that the tax eﬀects vary over the distribution of the MTR only for bank
deposits, insurances, mortgages, and consumer credits. For bank deposits, the unconditional
tax eﬀects on the conditional asset share range from +0.9%-points in the lowest tax bracket to
-2.0%-points in the highest (for insurances from -0.1 to +1.4, for mortgages from +1.2 to +2.3,
and for consumer credits from +1.4 to +0.8%). At the upper stage, tax eﬀects are constant
over the distribution of the MTR.
As already concluded earlier from the results for conditional tax eﬀects, in this study, there
are eﬀects of diﬀerential income taxation found on the asset allocation decision of private house-
holds in Germany. These eﬀects point in the same direction as the conditional tax eﬀects when
indirect budget eﬀects from the upper stage of the 2SBM are accounted for and unconditional
tax eﬀects are derived. The structure of the unconditional portfolio is shifted towards assets
that are relatively more tax-privileged, as demand for non-owner-occupied housing, for insur-
ances, and for mortgages increases when the MTR rises, and in turn demand for relatively less
tax-privileged assets as owner-occupied housing and non-privileged assets as bank deposits is
reduced. The size of these eﬀects should though be interpreted as rather limited for most of
the assets and especially lower than found in the relevant literature.
7 Conclusion
Eﬀects of diﬀerential taxation of capital income on households’ portfolio choice and asset allo-
cation decision have been investigated. A two-stage budgeting model of asset demand has been
applied to German survey data for a time frame where ﬁrst implementations of a major income
tax reform in Germany signiﬁcantly altered the tax tariﬀ. The presence of incomplete portfolios
was accounted for by structuring the model into the discrete asset choice and the continuous
asset choice. An income taxation module was constructed to simulate a marginal tax rate at
the household level. Rate-of-return elasticities as well as conditional and unconditional tax
eﬀects for various asset types were estimated and interpreted.
Households facing relatively higher marginal income tax rates are found to have relatively
greater demand for tax-privileged assets than households in the lower tax brackets. The higher
35the marginal tax rate the greater demand is for assets that are relatively more tax-privileged
in the German tax law. A 10%-points increase in the household’s marginal tax rate (from
a mean of 22.4%) increases the unconditional demand for non-owner-occupied housing assets
(from a share of 1.1% from total assets disposable to 1.2%), for mortgage repayments (from
12.5% to 12.9%), and for capital and private old-age pension insurance assets (from 15.8%
to 16.6%). Demand for some less privileged assets is reduced, as for bonds (from 0.8% to
0.7%) and especially for owner-occupied housing (from 3.1% to 2.3%), while it is increased for
other less privileged assets, as for stocks (from 5.7% to 5.9%). Demand for assets that are not
privileged in the tax system is ambiguous: while it is reduced for bank deposits (from 40.1%
to 39.3%), it is increased for consumer credit repayments (from 9.1% to 9.8%) and for building
society deposits (from 11.9% to 12.1%).
These results suggest that households in Germany structure their asset portfolios according
to incentives from state subsidization, at least as far as diﬀerential taxation of asset returns
and other income is concerned. There remains the open issue to which extent these eﬀects are
related to the presence of other subsidies and state grants that are not subject to taxation,
but that aﬀect the net return on assets. For Germany at that time, there was e.g. a home-
building allowance (Eigenheimzulage) granted on owner-occupied housing, and there still are
today building society premiums (Wohnungsbauprämie), which are paid for building society
deposits. There are savings bonuses for employees (Arbeitnehmersparzulage), which are paid for
contributions to capital formation that are directly invested by the employer out of basic salaries
(vermögenswirksame Leistungen). Today, asset accumulations for old-age pension income in
Germany are subsidized in the framework of the so called Riester-scheme. The eﬀects of all such
subsidies on the asset allocation decisions are not disentangled here yet from the tax eﬀects.
This shall be subject of further research in evaluation of speciﬁc policy reforms.
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41A Appendix - Estimation
Tests for the Demand System







Housing Assets 6:0 0:015 : : : :







Owner-Occ. 3:7 0:053 5:4 0:020 : : : :
Non-Owner O. 0:7 0:430 : : : : : :
Mortgages : : : : : : : :
All 5:2 0:073 : : : :







Bank Deposits 18:3 0:000 8:3 0:004 0:9 0:342 105:9 0:000 158:1 0:000
Building Soc.S. 3:2 0:073 : : 6:6 0:010 2:1 0:147 118:7 0:000
Stocks 5:3 0:021 : : : : 12:9 0:000 54:2 0:000
Bonds 2:2 0:138 : : : : : : 75:7 0:000
Insurances 2:5 0:114 : : : : : : : :
Cons.Credits : : : : : : : : : :
All 20:2 0:001 405:3 0:000 : : : : : :
Notes: Tests for homogeneity and symmetry are Wald tests with the number of constraints as degrees of freedom (c). At the ﬁrst-stage
demand system with two assets, testing for homogeneity and symmetry reduces to a test for a single constraint.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
Testing the Nested Structure
In order to test the nested structure, the MNL at the upper stage in Eq.(20) can be augmented





l;jb Il + j (28)
42where
P







is the inclusive value of
cluster l, which is computed with the b jjl from the MNLs for cluster l, see Greene (2003,
pp. 725-726), and Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 507-512).
Then, the nesting structure can be tested against a single MNL by a Wald test on the joint
hypothesis that all parameters on the inclusive values are equal to unity for each alternative (ex-
cept for the zero portfolio, which is the base alternative) at the upper stage, b hou;j = b fin;j = 1
8j = 1;:::;J1 1. For all these three tests, this hypothesis is rejected at the 1%-level, providing
further arguments for maintaining the nested structure of the 2SBM.
Table A.2: Wald Test on Inclusive Values in NLM
H0 : b hou;j = b fin;j = b loa;j = 1
Alternative 2 df P > 2
001 18.97 3 0.000
010 82.84 3 0.000
011 35.10 3 0.000
100 191.18 3 0.000
101 124.77 3 0.000
110 136.51 3 0.000
111 92.81 3 0.000
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
To further test the nested structure of the NLM for the discrete asset choice, tests for the
assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) are conducted. The IIA assumption
implies that the odds of the categories do not depend on other available categories. The MNL
relies on this assumption. It can be tested by the Hausman-McFadden test. This test compares
the full MNL model (i.e. with all categories) to restricted MNL models, where each model
exhibits one of the available categories (cf. Hausman and McFadden, 1984). So, for J available
categories, the test returns J test statistics, each with a null hypothesis of no systematic
diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of the full and the restricted model (i.e. the IIA assumption). The
resulting restricted models are estimated simultaneously here. In addition, the alternative
Small-Hsiao test is undertaken, see Small and Hsiao (1985).
Both tests for the IIA assumption are performed on a multinomial logit model for discrete
asset choice on a single stage. One multinomial model for all J = 9 assets, resulting in 29 = 512
distinct combinations would be computationally very challenging to estimate. Alternatively,
the IIA assumption is tested for a single-stage MNL of eight combinations resulting from the re-
stricted set of three assets: owner-occupied housing, mortgage repayments, and consumer credit
43repayments. Table A.3 provides evidence that the null hypothesis of no systematic diﬀerences
between the coeﬃcients can be rejected for this single-stage MNL, i.e. the IIA assumption does
not hold. This shall be interpreted as an argument to apply the nested structure of the NLM.
Table A.3: Tests for IIA Assumption in a Single-Stage MNL and in the NLM
Hausman Test Small-Hsiao Test
H0: diﬀerence in coeﬃcients not systematic (i.e. IIA holds)
Omitted Alt. 2 df P > 2 2 df P > 2
Single-stage MNL:
001 1271.397 180 0.000 466.982 180 0.000
010 880.109 180 0.000 522.341 180 0.000
011 431.961 180 0.000 359.935 180 0.000
100 1804.549 180 0.000 530.578 180 0.000
101 259.903 180 0.000 352.239 180 0.000
110 247.968 180 0.001 365.062 180 0.000
111 160.643 180 0.847 199.352 180 0.154
000 178.535 180 0.517 388.538 180 0.000
NLM within clusters:
Housing cluster:
01 63.698 30 0.000 21.111 30 0.884
10 51.562 30 0.008 15.281 30 0.988
11 19.152 30 0.937 21.755 30 0.863
Loan cluster:
01 307.035 30 0.000 38.028 30 0.149
10 179.428 30 0.000 79.491 30 0.000
11 395.357 30 0.000 30.088 30 0.461
Notes: Results of Hausman test based on simultaneous estimation. The single-stage MNL includes combinations of owner-occupied
housing, mortgage, and consumer credit.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
While the NLM relaxes the IIA assumption among the clusters, it is maintained within the
clusters. To test the latter, the Hausman-McFadden test and the Small-Hsiao test are conducted
on the MNLs within each cluster. Table A.3 provides evidence that the IIA assumption can
be maintained for most of the alternatives within the clusters. For the ﬁnancial cluster, these
tests could though not have be computed within reasonable time.
Taking together the tests on the inclusive values and on the IIA assumption, the results
suggest that the nested structure of the 2SBM as described in Section 3 is appropriate for the
estimation of the discrete asset choice in Eq.(17) here. Moreover, Bourguignon et al. (2007)
ﬁnd in simulations that selection estimation based on the MNL in general can provide fairly
good adjustment for the outcome equation, even if the IIA assumption is violated.
44Selection Correction
From the estimated conditional probabilities of positive demand for asset combination j in
cluster l (b Pjjl), a selection term is generated for each asset in Eq.(21) by aggregating over all
2Jl=2 combinations of an asset. This term corrects for conditional estimation of the continuous
asset choice. E.g., the conditional demand equation for owner-occupied housing assets in the
within-cluster MNL is augmented by
hou =

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where kl = 1 if asset combination k is chosen in cluster l (Amemiya et al., 1993).
Aggregating conditional probabilities over the combinations for each asset, yields uncondi-
tional probabilities for the assets.54 Likewise, from the MNL among the clusters in Eq.(20), un-
conditional probabilities for the two clusters can be derived by aggregating the predicted prob-
abilities over the alternatives to marginal probabilities: b Pl ; l 2 ffin;houg. Together with the
conditional probabilities, unconditional probabilities for the assets follow from: b Pjl = b Pjjl  b Pl.
54E.g. for stocks: Prob[stocks= 1jcfin = 1] =
P16
j=1 Prob[comb. other ﬁn. assets= j, stocks= 1jcfin = 1].
45B Appendix - A Module of Capital Income Taxation
An individual marginal tax rate is derived in a module of capital income taxation that imple-
ments the German income tax law as of the time of 1998 and 2003. This is necessary here, since
the actually assessed income tax burden is not observed in the data. Households only report
tax prepayments based on the current income from dependent employment in the respective
three months period. Thus, the observed quarterly income and expenditure components need
to be aggregated to an entire year. Generally, this is done assuming the quarterly observation
is representative for the entire year and thus multiplying it by four. Deviations from this pro-
cedure, in case of strong irregularities or seasonal patterns observed, are explicitly stated in
the following. In case, income or expenditure components are only observed at the aggregate
household level, they are distributed equally over all relevant members of the household. A
member of the household is regarded relevant in the context of taxable income if she reports
some positive income for any income component at the individual level.
Taxable income at the individual level is derived according to the scheme in Table B.1. In
the following, the single income components are described in further detail with respect to its
subcomponents, with respect to speciﬁc regulations on eligibility, maximum amounts, lump-
sum amounts, and application, and with respect to the implementation in the module of capital
income taxation.
Income from agriculture and forestry, income from trade or business, as well as
income from self-employment are aggregated as observed from quarterly values to annual
values, assuming they are constant over the quarters. Income from dependent employ-
ment as considered in the taxation module includes basic salaries, contributions to capital
formation, gross income from part-time work, in-kind transfers, retirement pensions for public
servants from own occupation or as a surviving relative. These income components are ag-
gregated as observed from quarterly values to annual values. Moreover irregular components
are included: compensations for early termination of a contract, bridge money, income from
employee proﬁt sharing, gratiﬁcations. For them the quarterly value is assumed to equal the
annual one. Furthermore, Christmas bonuses, vacation bonuses, extra month’s pay and other
extra payments are included. For them, a seasonality is observed, they occur more often in the
4th quarter than in all others. This seasonality eﬀect is estimated on the basis of employment
status and employment level and eliminated from the respective income components. For com-
pensations for early termination of a contract, there is an allowance dependent on age granted:
in 1998, generally up to 24,000 DM were tax-exempt, for age 50 plus, 30,000 DM, and for age
55 plus, 36,000 DM were tax-exempt. In 2003, 8,181 euros were generally deductible, 10,226
for age 50 plus, and 12,271 for age 55 plus. For retirement pensions for public servants, there
46Table B.1: Derivation of Taxable Income According to Ger-
man Income Tax Law (EStG)
Single income components:
income from agriculture and forestry
+ income from trade or business
+ income from self-employment
+ income from dependent employment
+ income from investment of capital
+ income from renting and leasing
+ other income
= sum of all forms of income
- allowance for agriculture and forestry
- relief for elderly retired people
= adjusted sum of all forms of income
- special expenses
- extraordinary ﬁnancial burden




- household allowance for single parents
= taxable income
Source: § 2 German income tax law (EStG).
is also an allowance granted: 40% of the pensions, a maximum of 6,000 DM in 1998 and 3,072
euros in 2003, were tax-exempt. Generally, income from dependent employment can be reduced
by income-related expenses, where for every individual the lump-sum allowance of 2,000 DM
in 1998 and 1,044 euros in 2003 is applied.
Income from investment of capital is observed diﬀerentiated by dividends, interests, and
other payouts, such as those from mutual funds. It is assumed that all taxable income from
exogenous investment of capital is captured by these components.55 The single income com-
ponents are reported net of withholding tax on capital income (Kapitalertragsteuer, KEST), a
prepayment on income tax. The KEST payment is not observed, it is inferred here from the sum
of all income from investment of capital. An allowance is granted on income from investment of
capital, 6,000 DM in 1998 and 1,550 euros in 2003 for each individual. It is assumed that this
55See Section C on how these income components are aggregated from quarterly to annual values.
47allowance is ﬁrstly applied to income from interests, then to income from other payouts, and
a remaining rest to income from dividends. Income that exceeds the allowance is assumed to
be subject to KEST, plus solidarity surcharge of 5.5% on the tax burden. KEST was 30% on
income from interests and presumably 25% on income from other payouts, as the exact source
of the payout is unknown. Income from dividends was treated diﬀerently in 1998 and 2003
with respect to the treatment of corporate taxes paid at the company level. In 1998, gross
dividends at the shareholder level were subject to the personal tax rate, while the corporate
tax payment was considered as a tax credit (the so called “Anrechnungsverfahren”).56 In 2003,
net dividends were subject to personal income taxation, where only 50% of the net dividend
are taxable (the so called “Halbeinkünfteverfahren”). Gross dividends include the corporate tax
payment, while net dividends exclude it and are moreover net of KEST at the shareholder level.
KEST on income from dividends was 25% in 1998 and 20% in 2003. The KEST payments can
be credited against the income tax liability as a tax credit. Generally, income from investment
of capital can be reduced by income-related expenses, where for every individual, the greater
of reported expenses for ﬁnancial services and a lump-sum of 100 DM (51 euros) is applied.
Income from interest payments included in premiums to capital wholesale and private old-age
pension insurances were tax exempt before 2005 if there are contributions paid for at least 5
years and the entire contract duration is at least 12 years. This is assumed here for any income
from selling insurance assets.
Income from renting and leasing is observed as income from renting and income from
subleasing. These components are reported net of income-related expenses, such as deprecia-
tion, interest payments, maintenance costs, insurances, administration costs. The sum of these
net income components is applied here as income from renting and leasing. Other income
is observed as income from old-age and other pensions, income from speculative trading, and
income from alimony.57 Income from any pensions is applied with a taxable fraction of 27%.58
Income from speculative trading occurs if households sell certain assets in a speciﬁc time frame
from the point of acquisition.59 If equities (i.e., stocks and bonds here) are sold within 6 months
from acquisition in 1998 (12 months in 2003) net proﬁts generated (i.e., income from selling less
costs of acquisition) are applied here as income from speculative trading.60 If housing assets are
56A corporate tax rate of 45% (Körperschaftsteuer) is applied here and it is assumed that no capital gains are
paid at the company level.
57Income from pensions includes income from private pension insurances, which are assumed to be related to
the exogenous stock of assets here.
58Since there is no information on the age at which income from old-age pensions was received for the ﬁrst
time, the statutory retirement age of 65 years is assumed here for all income from pensions.
59Note that income from selling assets is considered here exogenous to the asset allocation decision, as only
expenditures for asset accumulations are to be allocated here, see Section 3.
60There may occur losses from speculative trading, which may be deducted from any proﬁts from speculative
48sold within two years from acquisition in 1998, net proﬁts generated are taxable as income from
speculative trading. In 2003, housing assets were diﬀerentiated by owner-occupation. While
income from selling owner-occupied housing was tax exempt, income from selling non-owner
occupied housing is tax exempt iﬀ there are at least 10 years between acquisition and realiza-
tion, otherwise net proﬁts are fully taxable. Generally, income from speculative trading was
only taxable in case net proﬁts generated exceeded 1,000 DM in 1998 and 512 euros in 2003,
but in this case the entire net proﬁts were taxable.61 Income from alimony is assumed taxable
here upon approval of the recipient.62
The sum of all forms of income is reduced by two allowances: An allowance for agri-
culture and forestry is granted up to 2,000 DM in 1998 if income from agriculture and
forestry is not more than than 50,000 DM, and up to 670 euros in 2003 if income from agri-
culture and forestry is not more than 30,700 euros. A relief for elderly retired people
is granted, 40% of income from dependent employment less income-related expenses, up to a
maximum of 3,720 DM in 1998 and 1,908 euros in 2003, are tax exempt. There results the
adjusted sum of all forms of income. Further deductions are granted in the form of special
expenses, such as alimony payments, donations and membership fees devoted to certain pub-
lic institutions, church tax payments, and expenses for insurance premiums with provisional
character. Alimony payments are deductible (given the assumed approval of the recipient)
up to a maximum of 27,000 DM in 1998 and 13,805 euros in 2003. The sum of donations and
membership fees devoted to certain public institutions is deducted as far as it does not
exceed 5% of the adjusted sum of all forms of income.63 Church tax payments are deducted
as reported, aggregated to the year.
Expenses for insurance premiums with provisional character that are applied here as
special expenses are only those expenses that can be considered “inevitable” for the individual.
These are compulsory as well as voluntary contributions to the statutory pension insurance,
to the statutory health insurance, and to the social long-term care insurance, contributions to
private health and long term care insurances, contributions to the unemployment insurance,
premiums to personal liability insurances, and premiums to casualty insurances.64 The greater
trading. Such losses are assumed to be zero here.
61Assigning income from selling assets to income from speculative trading and to tax-exempt income according
to the tax regulations is not straight forward here, as the time of acquisition of the assets is not observed.
See Section C on how the time of acquisition is inferred. For income from selling business assets, the time
of acquisition can not be inferred, it is assumed tax exempt here.
62In this case, the payer may deduct the alimony payments as special expenses.
63Donations as well as membership fees devoted to certain public institutions are only observed for 2003. For
1998, they are estimated based on the expenses reported for 2003 and a set of household-related character-
istics in a low-limit tobit regression, censoring at zero.
64Premiums to personal liability insurances could not be distinguished in the data for 1998 from premiums to
liability insurances for cars.
49of actual expenses and a lump-sum allowance for provisional expenses is applied, where the
lump-sum allowance is a stepwise function of income from dependent employment reduced
by the relief for elderly retired people and the allowance for retirement pensions for public
servants (§10c EStG). There is a section for low incomes, one for mid-level incomes, and one for
high incomes. For pensioners and employees who do not contribute to the statutory pension
insurance, there is an alternative lump-sum allowance. The resulting expenses can only be
deducted up to a maximum allowance for provisional expenses, which is a function of income
from dependent employment reduced by income from retirement pensions for public servants.
Again, there are three sections by level of applied income. There result actually deductible
expenses for insurance premiums with provisional character. The greater of the sum of all
special expenses and a lump-sum allowance of 108 DM (36 euros) is deducted.
Further deductions are granted for expenses due to extraordinary ﬁnancial burden.
These may be related to disability, to the death of relatives, or to the presence of house-
hold members in need for care. Households report expenses for services related to assistance
for old people, disabled people, and people in need for care. Since neither the degree of dis-
ability, nor the degree of need for care are observed, it is assumed that all expenses reported
can be deducted up to a maximum of 1,800 DM in 1998 and 924 euros in 2003 per individual.
In addition, there is an allowance for the education of children. In 1998, there were 2,400 DM
deductible for each child aged 18 or older, that is a member of the household and eligible for
child beneﬁt (Kindergeld) or child allowance (Kinderfreibetrag). In 2003, such expenses were
assigned to the child allowance, see below. Expenses for children that are not members of the
household are assumed to be reported as alimony payments and are thus already deducted as
special expenses. Other extraordinary ﬁnancial burden may result from occupation of domestic
help, for which households report expenses. They are deductible up to 1,200 DM (624 euros)
for individuals aged 60 or older. Moreover, expenses for childcare may be deducted as far as
they exceed a reasonable amount. For 1998, the amount considered reasonable is a function
of the adjusted sum of all forms of income and the number of children below the age of 18.
Expenses may be deducted for each child that belongs to the household and is younger than 16
if the individual is working and not married. In 2003, expenses may be deducted for each child
that belongs to the household and is younger than 14 if the individual is either working or in
education. The reasonable amount is 1,548 euros for each child. The maximum deduction is
4,000 DM for the ﬁrst child and 2,000 DM for each following in 1998, and 750 euros for each
child in 2003.
Further deductions are granted in the form of tax shields for owner-occupied hous-
ing. The relevant tax shield regulations for 1998 and 2003 are found in §10e, §10h, and §10i
50EStG.65 §10e and §10h EStG are relevant in case construction of the building was started before
01.01.1996, §10i EStG in case it was started after this date. Matching the households’ expenses
for the stock of housing assets to the respective regulations is not straight forward here, since
it is not observed at what time the construction of the building was started. But, this informa-
tion can be inferred with the help of reasonable assumptions. Households report expenses for
repayment of housing-related loans, related interest payments as well as the remaining level of
debt. Assuming a long-term ﬁxed-rate annuity loan with a constant rate of repayment added
interest (i.e. the annuity) which is paid monthly,66 an overall time frame for repayment of 30
years and an interest rate of 8% in 1998 and 7% in 2003, the initial loan amount as well as the
time it was taken up can be calculated. Further assuming that 80% of the total expenses for
housing assets are ﬁnanced by debt, the initial costs of purchasing result.67
According to §10e and §10h EStG, if construction was started before 01.01.1996, 6% of the
costs of purchasing the building (a maximum of 19,800 DM in 1998 and 10,124 euros in 2003)
may be deducted each year in the ﬁrst four years, and another 5% in the following four years (a
maximum of 16,500 DM in 1998 and 8,437 euros in 2003). The building needs to be occupied
by the owner and may not be occupied for weekends or holidays only.68 The adjusted sum of
all forms of income of the owner may not exceed 120,000 DM (61,355 euros). If construction
was started after 01.01.1996, but before 01.01.1999, expenses can be deducted according to
§10i EStG as initial costs in line with the home-building allowance (Eigenheimzulage, EHZ).
In the year of the purchase, an owner buying a house who is eligible for the EHZ may deduct
a lump-sum 3,500 DM for purchasing costs, and a former tenant buying the occupied ﬂat up
to 22,500 DM of maintenance costs that do not belong to purchasing costs. Maintenance costs
for owner-occupied housing are deducted here as observed for the quarter up to 22,500 DM if
construction was started between 01.01.1996 and 01.01.1999. For purchasing costs, lump-sum
3,500 DM are deducted in case of eligibility for EHZ and construction was started between
01.01.1996 and 01.01.1999. Eligibility for the EHZ demands that the adjusted sum of all forms
of income in the year of the purchase and the year before do not exceed 160,000 DM added
65It is assumed that there are no old cases remaining from the tax shields in §7b and §7c EStG, which were
abolished in 1987.
66Assuming monthly repayment, the annuity is inferred multiplying observed quarterly interest and repayment
by four.
67This procedure assumes that the construction of the building did not start later than the loan was taken up.
A further assumption, which is probably more severe, is that only households that report remaining debts
on housing to be repaid deduct housing-related expenses from income.
68Expenses for repayment of housing-related loans and remaining level of debt are only observed pooled for
all real estates the household owns, occupied by household members or not. The fraction that is related
to owner-occupied housing assets can though be estimated by information on various expenses related to
operation and maintenance of the houses. See Section C for further details.
5160,000 DM for each child eligible for child beneﬁt.69
There is no information observed on loss deductions. It is assumed that households do
not deduct any losses that emerged in the current year or in any previous years. Reducing the
adjusted sum of all forms of income by special expenses, expenses due to extraordinary ﬁnancial
burden, and tax shields for owner-occupied housing results in income according to tax law.
Income may be reduced by a child allowance as well as a household allowance for single parents.
For 1998 and 2003, either a child allowance is deducted or households keep the child beneﬁts
they received. There is a check undertaken here for which variant is the more favorable for
the household, a so called higher-yield test. If it is the child allowance that results in a lower
tax burden, the child allowance is deducted and the received child beneﬁts are added to the
resulting tax burden. In case the child beneﬁts are more favorable, the child allowance is not
applied and households keep the received child beneﬁts. The child allowance applied amounts
to 3,456 DM in 1998 and 2,904 euros in 2003.70 It is deducted for both, the household head
and its partner. In case spouses are jointly assessed for income taxation,71 the child allowance
is doubled and solely deducted for the household head. Children are eligible for child allowance
if they are aged below 18, or if they are aged between 18 and 21 and searching for a job,
while unemployed, or if they are younger than 27 and currently in education. Furthermore, a
household allowance for single parents is granted for individuals who are not married and
are either eligible for the child allowance or live in a household with children that are eligible
for child beneﬁts. This allowance amounts to 5,616 DM for 1998 and 2,340 euros for 2003.
Deducting the household allowance for single parents and the child allowance in case it is more
favorable than child beneﬁts results in taxable income. There remain some income compo-
nents which are not taxable, but which aﬀect progressive taxation (Progressionsvorbehalt).
As such are treated here for 1998 and 2003: unemployment beneﬁts, unemployment assistance,
transfers related to employment promotions, compensations for short-time work, beneﬁts for
part-time retirement, beneﬁts for maternity leave, sickness beneﬁts and other transfers from
the statutory health insurance, and transfers from the European Social Fund. The relevant tax
rate is derived by adding these income components to taxable income and applying the tax
tariﬀ according to §32a EStG to this sum. The resulting tax rate is then applied to taxable
income and the tax burden results.
69Income of the previous year is not observed in the EVS for 1998 and 2003. For the income limit here, it is
assumed that the adjusted sum of all forms of income in the previous year equals the one for the year of
interview.
70For 2003, this includes the allowance for the education of children of 1,824 euros, which was in 1998 deductible
separately as extraordinary ﬁnancial burden, see above.
71Spouses are assumed to choose joint assessment for taxation iﬀ they are married.
52Married couples are assumed to choose joint assessment.72 For them, individual taxable
incomes are added up, so are the non-taxable income components aﬀecting progressive taxation,
the tax tariﬀ is applied to half of this sum, and the resulting tax burden is doubled.
Table B.2: Distribution of Household Marginal Tax Rate
1998 2003
Taxable Income Mean Sd Min Max Taxable Income Mean Sd Min Max
in 000 DM in percent in 000 Euro in percent
0 1.8 3.6 0.0 24.5 0 2.0 4.3 0.0 31.0
0 - 20 6.4 10.4 0.0 27.3 0 - 10 3.9 7.7 0.0 30.0
20 - 25 26.3 2.9 13.6 28.2 10 - 12.5 22.8 2.7 6.7 32.3
25 - 30 27.4 2.6 13.4 29.1 12.5 - 15 24.5 2.3 13.8 29.5
30 - 35 28.5 2.3 15.5 31.3 15 - 17.5 26.1 2.1 15.0 32.2
35 - 40 29.7 2.0 18.1 31.2 17.5 - 20 27.6 1.8 17.0 31.5
40 - 50 31.2 1.8 18.8 35.0 20 - 25 29.8 1.8 18.6 38.2
50 - 60 33.2 1.4 22.5 36.5 25 - 30 32.6 1.6 21.1 37.3
60 - 70 35.9 1.4 24.9 41.8 30 - 35 35.5 1.6 19.4 41.5
70 - 80 38.9 1.5 26.5 43.3 35 - 40 38.4 1.4 24.3 42.5
80 - 100 43.1 2.0 26.5 48.6 40 - 50 42.2 2.1 24.2 46.5
> 100 50.4 3.5 21.2 53.1 > 50 47.3 2.8 24.2 48.5
Total 19.3 15.0 0.0 53.1 Total 18.0 15.1 0.0 48.5
Notes: Data weighted by population weights.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
Individual marginal tax rates are generated by incrementing taxable income assuming the
increment is fully taxable and is not accompanied by any deductible expenses.The diﬀerence in
tax burdens resulting from the increment is applied as a general marginal tax rate on income.
Individual marginal tax rates are aggregated to a marginal tax rate at the household level
by a weighted average. The weighting scheme generally assumes that the tax rates of the
household head and a second adult individual have the greatest relevance concerning asset
allocation decisions, tax rates of other adult household members are less relevant, and that
children’s tax rates are irrelevant. Thus, here only individuals aged 18 or older are considered
as household members. In case of a single-member household, the individual’s tax rate equals
the household’s tax rate. For two-member households, equal weighting is applied if members
are head and partner, otherwise the head’s tax rate gets a weight of 0.8 and the other member’s
one 0.2. For three-member households, head and partner get equal weights of 0.4 each, and
the third member 0.2. If the head does not have a partner in the household, he gets 0.8,
72In the data, for every household with a married household head, the second individual is also married.
For exactly these couples, joint assessment is applied. Only for 0.5% of the sample there appear married
individuals together with an unmarried household head.
53and the other two members get equal weights of 0.1 each. In a four-person household, head
and partner share the weight 0.8 equally, while a weight of 0.2 is shared equally by the other
two members. A head without a partner gets 0.8, while the three other members share the
remaining weight of 0.2 equally. This approach is applied accordingly to ﬁve- and six-person
households. There results one general marginal tax rate on income at the household
level for each household.
C Appendix - Data and Household Asset Portfolios
C.1 Data
The data applied stem from the Income and Consumption Survey for Germany (Einkommens-
und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS). The EVS is maintained by the German Federal Statistical
Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt, StaBu). Households are recruited for reports according to
stratiﬁed quota samples from Germany’s current population survey (Mikrozensus). They are
aggregated to the population according to a marginal distribution of demographic variables.
Participation is not mandatory, it is voluntary. Due to voluntary participation, the EVS is not
a random sample from the entire population. Generally underrepresented are self-employed,
farmers, workers, foreigners, single-person households and households at the bottom and the
top of the income distribution. Although quota are tried to be fulﬁlled and population weights
applied, there remains a selection bias towards the middle income groups in the EVS-samples,
see Becker and Hauser (2004). If this bias is similar in the two cross-sections under consideration
it should not be too problematic for comparisons between these points in time. However, this
restriction w.r.t. the represented population should be kept in mind when making comparisons
of aggregations from the sample with aggregates from other oﬃcial statistics. The entire
population covered by the EVS is moreover restricted, not covered are: institutionalized people
(i.e. military people in caserns, students in dormitories, elderly and disabled people in nursery
homes or hospitals, nurses or migrant workers in residences, people in jails), homeless people,
and households with monthly net household income greater than 35,000 DM for 1998 (18,000
euros for 2003).
When households report income and expenditures by single components, this information
does not always exactly balance out. Thus, the StaBu generates a so called “statistical diﬀer-
ence” in order to even out households’ balance sheets. This statistical diﬀerence is redeﬁned
here, such that it balances the two ways of deriving savings in Eq.(1).
The sample of the two cross sections for 1998 and 2003 is reduced with respect to outliers
and implausible observations. In particular, observations are dropped if:
541. Modiﬁed-OECD-equivalence-scale weighted monthly disposable household income is be-
low 300 euros (in prices of 2003) (drops 23 observations)
2. Statistical diﬀerence in absolute terms is more than twice as large as disposable household
income (drops 174 observations)
3. Consumption (adjusted for redistributions of durable goods expenditures) is more than
twice as large as disposable household income (drops 321 observations)
4. Other expenditures (not attributed to any category of consumption) is more than twice
as large as disposable household income (drops 42 observations)
This reduces the overall sample size from 92,464 observations by 560 (about 0.6 percent) to
91,904 observations. This reduction appears to be within the range of usual procedure.
Household information in this analysis is weighted by population weights. Household weights
are constructed according to the relation of the number of observations in the sample to the
number of households in the population. For 1998, the population is stratiﬁed by: location in
federal states, by household type, social status, household net income. For 2003, the population
is stratiﬁed by: location in federal states, household type, social status, and household net
income, and additionally by age of household head.73 According to its stratiﬁcation, the sample
is aggregated to the population, see Statistisches Bundesamt (2005) for methodological details.
The household weights in the SUF are incorrect for 2003. They have been regenerated such
that the weighted sample units match the population sizes in each strata (cf. Buslei, Schulz,
and Steiner (2007)).
Expenditures for housing assets are not reported separately for owner-occupied (OO) hous-
ing and non-owner occupied (NOO) housing. The allocation of housing expenditures at the
household level to these asset types is thus estimated exploiting reported information on the
following items: total number of real estates holding in stock, status of living, income from
renting, expenditures for housing maintenance (reported by OO and NOO housing), reserves for
maintenance (reported by OO and NOO housing), current expenditures for utilities (reported
by OO and NOO housing).
Income from selling equities is not reported separately for stocks and bonds, only expendi-
tures for buying them. In order to detect income from speculative trading, sales are though
needed separately for stocks and bonds. This allocation is estimated by asset holdings for
stocks and bonds.
When quarterly data are aggregated to annual data, for certain income components, seasonal
eﬀects are estimated and eliminated; such are Christmas bonuses, vacation bonuses, extra
73Household head is deﬁned to be the person with the highest income in the household.
55month’s pay and other extra payments. Also for income from investment of capital, such
as interest payments and dividends, seasonality is observed and eliminated, as interest on
investment of capital is more often paid in the ﬁrst and in the fourth quarter, and dividends
are more often paid in the second quarter.
When deriving taxable income, other income from speculative trading is not directly ob-
served, as the time of acquisition of the assets is not observed. This point in time has been
approximated from the respective stock of asset holdings. For 2003, additionally interest in-
come from bonds and other deposits as well as dividends aggregated for the entire previous
year is applied. For 1998, this is though not reported.
Insurance asset holdings are derived from reported cash values of insurances or in case of
item non-response cash values are estimated with information on the contribution rate, the
duration of the insurance contract, and commission fees as well as proﬁt participation rates,
which households are ask to report in case they do not report the cash value of an insurance,
which are though not available in the scientiﬁc use ﬁles of the data.
From Eqs.(2) and (3), it follows that total assets disposable can be decomposed into accu-
mulations in the J asset classes that are considered here:
Expenditures for housing assets (gross, including loans raised to buy a house)
+ Expenditures for ﬁnancial assets
+ Expenditures for loan repayments
- Revolving assets
= Total assets disposable for allocation
= Expenditures for owner-occupied housing
+ Expenditures for non-owner-occupied housing
+ Repayments of housing-related loans (mortgages)
+ Assets accumulated in savings accounts and ﬁxed deposits
+ Assets accumulated in building society deposits
+ Assets accumulated in stocks
+ Assets accumulated in bonds
+ Assets accumulated in (life and private pension) insurances
+ Repayments of consumption loans
- Revolving assets
(29)
Concerning the deﬁnition of total assets disposable, an example may help understand the set-
ting. Consider a household with current disposable income Y = 1;000 that decided to consume
C = 2;000, liquidate stock holdings of A
 
STO = 5;000, and take up a loan of L
 
HOU = 8;000 to
56ﬁnance a house purchase for own occupation, A
+
OOH = 10;000. Additionally a consumer loan is
repaid, L
+
FIN = 1;000, and stocks are purchased, A
+
STO = 1;000. This household’s net savings







































C.2 Rates of Return
Generally, gross rates of return to assets are generated as quarterly averages of aggregate
monthly rates of return published by Germany’s national bank. Their generation for the
various types of assets under consideration here is in the following described in detail.
For owner-occupied housing assets, average rates of return to owner-occupied housing
are adjusted by current shifts in the prices for construction of new houses and purchase of
land, diﬀerentiated by type of house and by East- and West-Germany. Additionally, the rate
of return is increased by an estimated rate of return to the home-building allowance (Eigen-
heimzulage) for eligible households. For non-owner-occupied housing assets, ﬁrst of all,
average rates of return to non-owner-occupied housing are adjusted by current shifts in the
prices for construction of new houses and purchase of land, diﬀerentiated by type of house and
by East- and West-Germany, similarly to owner-occupied housing assets. Then, gross returns
are diﬀerentiated by returns that are related to income from renting and leasing and returns
that are related to income from speculative trading of rented housing assets. The latter was
tax exempt if there were at least two years between buying and selling the asset in 1998, which
was increased to ten years in 2003. It is assumed that thereby that part of the total returns
that is related to speculative trading is reduced. This reduction is further diﬀerentiated by the
exogenous income from renting and leasing that the household already earned from housing
asset holdings. As net income from renting and leasing is taxable, which is typically negative,
it can actually reduce the tax burden.
For mortgages repayments, average interest rates for mortgage loans on residential hous-
ing ﬁxed for ten years that was valid at the time the loan was contracted are applied. The
time the loan was contracted is estimated. Together with the average interest rates, assuming
a long-term ﬁxed-rate annuity loan with a constant rate of monthly repayment added interest
(i.e. the annuity) and an overall time frame for repayment of 30 years, the initial loan amount
as well as the time it was taken up can be inferred. The structure of mortgage repayments
57w.r.t. owner-occupied housing and non-owner-occupied housing is further assumed to be de-
termined by the respective structure of housing asset holdings. It is considered that mortgage
repayments to loans that are related to rented housing are tax-deductible, while such that are
related to owner-occupied housing are not. For households that have zero housing asset hold-
ings and thus do not currently hold a mortgage, a ten-year average of rates on mortgages loans
is applied. As with consumer credits, the asset under consideration is mortgage repayments, so
that the resulting rates are applied in positive terms in the price function, as with any other
asset under consideration here.
For bank deposits, a weighted average of the rates of return to short-term savings, to
one-month ﬁxed deposits diﬀerentiated by face value, and to sight deposits is applied, where
the weights are a function of the structure of deposit holdings w.r.t. savings deposits and ﬁxed
deposits. For building society deposits, the rate of return is ﬁxed when the contract is signed.
This information is not reported, but it can be estimated given the stock of deposit holdings
and an assumption on average contributions. As a proxy for the actual return, the rate for
short-term bank deposits at the estimated time of contract initiation is applied. Additionally,
building society premiums (Wohnungsbauprämie) are considered.
For stocks, average total returns to German stocks for the last 20 years are applied, ad-
ditionally averaged over various time frames of investment horizon. Total returns are further
diﬀerentiated by dividend-related returns and residual price-related trade returns. Only the
dividend-related returns are assumed generally taxable. Average dividend-related returns to
German DAX-listed companies are applied. Furthermore, taxation of dividends is implemented,
which was changed in 2000/2001 from taxation of gross dividends and consideration of corpo-
rate tax payments as tax credits (the so called “Anrechnungsverfahren”) to taxation of net
dividends with only 50% of the dividends taxable (the so called “Halbeinkünfteverfahren”). It
is assumed that this shift reduces the long-term total rate of return to stocks by 25%, as the
corporate tax payment can not be considered as a tax credit anymore. For bonds, the current
yield on domestic private and public securities is applied. Additionally, net proﬁts generated
from speculative trading is considered as a potential increase in the rate of return to bonds,
especially in case the tax-free allowance for interest income is already exploited.
For life and private pension insurances, as a proxy, the rate of returns to bank deposits
which are ﬁxed for more than four years for the time of contract initiation is applied. Contract
initiation is estimated with the stock of asset holdings in insurance contracts and an assumption
on average contributions. The fact that contributions to life and private pension insurances
for the purpose of old-age were fully deductible from taxable income up to a cap until 2005
was considered as a mark-up on the rate of return depending on the marginal tax rate. For
consumer credit repayments, the average interest rate on consumer credits from banks for
58the time of contract initiation is applied. The time of contract initiation is estimated with an
average time for repayment of a loan, and the latter in turn is estimated with average observed
loan repayments and average observed loans outstanding together with current interest rates.
Rates are further diﬀerentiated by the loan volume taken up and by the actual opportunity
costs of repaying a loan. For households that do not currently hold a loan, a four-year average
of the interest rate on consumer credits is applied. As the asset under consideration is loan
repayments, the resulting rates are applied in positive terms in the price function, as opposed
to loan take-up, where the price would rather depend negatively on the interest rate.
C.3 Household Asset Portfolios
Table C.1: Household Asset Demand
Conditional Shares ( sjjl) Unconditional Shares ( sj)
in percent  Aj=  Al  sjjl sd( sjjl)  Aj=  Al  sj sd( sj)
Total assets disposable 100:0 100:0 0:0 100:0 100:0 0:0
Housing assets 30:2 13:2 26:6 30:2 13:2 26:6
Financial assets 69:8 86:8 26:6 69:8 86:8 26:6
Housing Assets:
Owner-occupied housing 41:9 17:0 35:6 12:6 2:6 13:5
Non-owner-occupied housing 22:7 6:0 22:1 6:8 0:9 8:0
Mortgage repayments 35:4 77:1 39:6 10:7 9:6 22:1
Financial Assets:
Bank deposits 56:4 47:7 42:7 39:4 43:7 41:6
Building-society deposits 10:6 14:2 26:8 7:4 11:3 23:1
Stocks 14:5 5:9 19:4 10:1 5:1 17:7
Bonds 2:4 0:8 7:3 1:7 0:7 6:8
Life and private pension insurances 9:8 20:1 31:5 6:8 16:2 27:9
Consumer credit repayments 6:3 11:4 26:2 4:4 9:9 24:3
Ntot (unweighted) 85;699
Ntot (weighted, in 000s) 66;703
Nhou (unweighted) 32;961
Nhou (weighted, in 000s) 19;984
Nfin (unweighted) 84;046
Nfin (weighted, in 000s) 65;437
Notes:  Aj=  Al is the ratio of aggregate demand to aggregate budget, while  sjjl is the average demand share. Conditional shares
refer to the subpopulation with positive demand in the corresponding asset cluster. Data weighted by population weights.
Reading example: Among households with demand for any assets, the average share of housing assets is 13.2%. Among households
with demand for housing assets, the average share of owner-occupied housing is 17.0%. However, aggregate demand for the latter
related to aggregate demand for housing assets is much greater (41.9%).
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
59D Appendix - Results
D.1 Results - Rate-of-Return Elasticities
Table D.1: Rate-of-Return and Budget Elasticities on Conditional First-
Stage Asset Demand Levels
on Asset Levels Housing Assets Financial Assets
Unconstrained
Budget El. (b jjl)a 1:195 0:961
(0:005) (0:001)
Uncompensated Own-Rate (b "
(r)
jjjl) Cross-Rate Elasticity (b "
(r)
jkjl)
Housing Assets 0:558 :  0:444
(0:049) : (0:024)
Financial Assets 0:089  0:111 :
(0:005) (0:010) :
Compensated
Housing Assets 0:600 :  0:478
(0:049) : (0:024)
Financial Assets 0:096  0:120 :
(0:005) (0:010) :
Constrained
Budget El. (b jjl)a 1:196 0:961
(0:005) (0:001)
Uncompensated Own-Rate (b "
(r)
jjjl) Cross-Rate Elasticity (b "
(r)
jkjl)
Housing Assets 0:646 :  0:419
(0:033) : (0:021)
Financial Assets 0:084  0:129 :
(0:004) (0:007) :
Compensated
Housing Assets 0:688 :  0:453
(0:033) : (0:021)
Financial Assets 0:091  0:137 :
(0:004) (0:007) :
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0:10,
**p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01. Elasticities are computed at the mean of all covariates. b jjl is the conditional
budget elasticity on asset levels, b "
(r)
jjjl is the own-rate elasticity of asset j on asset levels, conditional on
the budget in cluster l. b "
(r)
jkjl is the respective cross-rate elasticity.
a: Null hypothesis for the budget elasticities is b j = 1.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
60Table D.2: Rate-of-Return and Budget Elasticities on Conditional Housing Asset Levels
on Asset Levels Owner-Occupied Non-Owner-Occupied Mortgages
Unconstrained
Budget El. (b jjl)a 1:234 1:399 0:926
(0:008) (0:014) (0:002)
Uncompensated Own-Rate (b "
(r)
jjjl) Cross-Rate Elasticity (b "
(r)
jkjl)
Owner-Occupied Housing 0:785 :  0:372  0:243
(0:094) : (0:219) (0:046)
Non-Owner-Occupied 1:056 0:299 :  0:798
(0:380) (0:164) : (0:080)
Mortgage Repayments 0:105  0:174  0:004 :
(0:010) (0:020) (0:046) :
Compensated
Owner-Occupied Housing 0:827 :  0:377  0:292
(0:094) : (0:219) (0:046)
Non-Owner-Occupied 1:124 0:288 :  0:853
(0:380) (0:164) : (0:080)
Mortgage Repayments 0:068  0:181 0:065 :
(0:010) (0:020) (0:046) :
Constrained
Budget El. (b jjl)a 1:235 1:398 0:926
(0:008) (0:014) (0:002)
Uncompensated Own-Rate (b "
(r)
jjjl) Cross-Rate Elasticity (b "
(r)
jkjl)
Owner-Occupied Housing 0:398 :  0:040  0:349
(0:065) : (0:079) (0:042)
Non-Owner-Occupied 1:255  0:073 :  0:763
(0:238) (0:149) : (0:078)
Mortgage Repayments 0:123  0:072  0:083 :
(0:009) (0:008) (0:008) :
Compensated
Owner-Occupied Housing 0:440 :  0:045  0:398
(0:065) : (0:079) (0:042)
Non-Owner-Occupied 1:323  0:084 :  0:819
(0:238) (0:149) : (0:078)
Mortgage Repayments 0:086  0:079  0:013 :
(0:009) (0:008) (0:008) :
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
Elasticities are computed at the mean of all covariates and are deﬁned as in Table (D.1).
a: Null hypothesis for the budget elasticities is b j = 1.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
61Table D.3: Rate-of-Return and Budget Elasticities on Conditional Financial Asset Demand Levels
on Asset Levels Bank Deposits Building S.Dep. Stocks Bonds Insurances Cs. Credits
Unconstrained
Budg. El. (b jjl) a 1:297 0:746 1:492 1:889 0:443 0:822
(0:002) (0:005) (0:009) (0:026) (0:004) (0:006)
Uncompensated Own-Rate (b "
(r)
jjjl) Cross-Rate Elasticity (b "
(r)
jkjl)
Bank Deposits  0:009 :  0:019 0:251 0:572  0:361  0:084
(0:004) : (0:005) (0:021) (0:055) (0:007) (0:002)
Building S.Dep. 0:160  0:030 : 0:085 0:162  0:244  0:054
(0:010) (0:008) : (0:042) (0:111) (0:014) (0:005)
Stocks  0:357 0:107  0:036 :  0:738  0:281  0:116
(0:075) (0:015) (0:018) : (0:195) (0:025) (0:009)
Bonds  0:607 0:064 0:042  0:578 :  0:261  0:182
(0:581) (0:043) (0:054) (0:222) : (0:075) (0:025)
Insurances 1:092 0:012  0:043  0:398  0:736 :  0:056
(0:011) (0:006) (0:008) (0:032) (0:084) : (0:004)
Credits 0:622  0:014  0:050  0:131  0:686  0:044 :
(0:006) (0:010) (0:012) (0:051) (0:134) (0:017) :
Compensated
Bank Deposits  0:007 :  0:030 0:244 0:572  0:376  0:088
(0:004) : (0:005) (0:021) (0:055) (0:007) (0:002)
Building S.Dep. 0:208  0:031 : 0:081 0:162  0:252  0:056
(0:010) (0:008) : (0:042) (0:111) (0:014) (0:005)
Stocks  0:286 0:104  0:049 :  0:739  0:297  0:121
(0:075) (0:015) (0:018) : (0:195) (0:025) (0:009)
Bonds  0:570 0:061 0:025  0:589 :  0:282  0:187
(0:581) (0:043) (0:054) (0:222) : (0:075) (0:025)
Insurances 1:139 0:011  0:047  0:400  0:736 :  0:057
(0:011) (0:006) (0:008) (0:032) (0:084) : (0:004)
Credits 0:647  0:015  0:057  0:135  0:687  0:053 :
(0:006) (0:010) (0:012) (0:051) (0:134) (0:017) :
Constrained
Budg. El. (b jjl) a 1:297 0:742 1:495 1:892 0:444 0:826
(0:002) (0:005) (0:009) (0:026) (0:004) (0:006)
Uncompensated Own-Rate (b "
(r)
jjjl) Cross-Rate Elasticity (b "
(r)
jkjl)
Bank Deposits 0:035 : 0:003 0:158 0:018  0:357  0:091
(0:002) : (0:005) (0:012) (0:007) (0:006) (0:002)
Building S.Dep. 0:192  0:000 :  0:020 0:001  0:112  0:036
(0:010) (0:001) : (0:011) (0:002) (0:008) (0:003)
Stocks  0:168 0:059  0:025 :  0:043  0:281  0:102
(0:061) (0:004) (0:017) : (0:013) (0:022) (0:008)
Bonds  0:082 0:109 0:043  0:689 :  0:327  0:201
(0:307) (0:043) (0:054) (0:217) : (0:075) (0:025)
Insurances 1:056  0:067  0:090  0:145  0:010 :  0:051
(0:010) (0:001) (0:006) (0:011) (0:002) : (0:003)
Credits 0:608  0:062  0:104  0:188  0:023  0:181 :
(0:006) (0:001) (0:009) (0:014) (0:003) (0:010) :
Compensated
Bank Deposits 0:037 :  0:008 0:151 0:018  0:371  0:094
(0:002) : (0:005) (0:012) (0:007) (0:006) (0:002)
Building S.Dep. 0:240  0:002 :  0:024 0:001  0:120  0:039
(0:010) (0:001) : (0:011) (0:002) (0:008) (0:003)
Stocks  0:096 0:056  0:038 :  0:043  0:297  0:106
(0:061) (0:004) (0:017) : (0:013) (0:022) (0:008)
Bonds  0:045 0:105 0:027  0:699 :  0:347  0:207
(0:307) (0:043) (0:053) (0:217) : (0:075) (0:025)
Insurances 1:103  0:068  0:094  0:148  0:011 :  0:052
(0:010) (0:001) (0:006) (0:011) (0:002) : (0:003)
Credits 0:633  0:063  0:111  0:193  0:023  0:190 :
(0:006) (0:001) (0:009) (0:014) (0:003) (0:010) :
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
Elasticities are computed at the mean of all covariates and are deﬁned as in Table (D.1). a: Null hypothesis for the budget elasticities is
b j = 1.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
62Table D.4: Rate-of-Return and Budget Elasticities on Unconditional Asset Demand Levels
(from the Unconstrained Estimation)
on Levels Owner Non-O. Mortg. Bank D. Building Stocks Bonds Insur. Credits
Budg. El. (b j) a 2:716 3:077 2:037 2:294 1:320 2:639 3:341 0:784 1:453




jj ) (b "
(r)
jk )
Owner Occ. 1:130 :  0:244 1:480  0:181  0:067  0:028  0:004  0:088  0:045
(0:096) : (0:219) (0:082) (0:150) (0:045) (0:021) (0:003) (0:059) (0:034)
Non-Owner 1:201 0:690 : 1:155  0:206  0:076  0:032  0:004  0:100  0:050
(0:380) (0:165) : (0:112) (0:170) (0:050) (0:024) (0:003) (0:067) (0:038)
Mortgages 1:397 0:085 0:092 :  0:136  0:050  0:021  0:003  0:066  0:033
(0:051) (0:023) (0:046) : (0:112) (0:033) (0:016) (0:002) (0:044) (0:025)
Bank Deposits 1:180  0:018  0:007  0:097 : 0:367 0:427 0:596 0:151 0:194
(0:126) (0:010) (0:004) (0:040) : (0:038) (0:028) (0:055) (0:050) (0:029)
Building S.Dep. 0:382  0:010  0:004  0:056 0:655 : 0:186 0:175 0:051 0:106
(0:024) (0:006) (0:002) (0:023) (0:073) : (0:044) (0:111) (0:032) (0:017)
Stocks  0:155  0:021  0:008  0:112 1:476 0:409 :  0:712 0:309 0:203
(0:077) (0:011) (0:004) (0:047) (0:146) (0:047) : (0:195) (0:063) (0:034)
Bonds  0:573  0:026  0:010  0:141 1:797 0:604  0:323 : 0:485 0:223
(0:581) (0:014) (0:005) (0:059) (0:190) (0:077) (0:224) : (0:105) (0:049)
Insurances 1:267  0:006  0:002  0:033 0:418 0:089  0:338  0:728 : 0:039
(0:020) (0:003) (0:001) (0:014) (0:044) (0:015) (0:033) (0:084) : (0:010)
Credits 0:798  0:011  0:004  0:062 0:740 0:195  0:020  0:672 0:280 :




jj ) (b "
(r)
jk )
Owner Occ. 0:965 :  0:326 0:394 0:060 0:004 0:006 0:001 0:006 0:010
(0:096) : (0:219) (0:081) (0:150) (0:045) (0:021) (0:003) (0:059) (0:034)
Non-Owner 1:182 0:445 :  0:076 0:068 0:004 0:007 0:001 0:006 0:011
(0:380) (0:165) : (0:110) (0:170) (0:050) (0:024) (0:003) (0:067) (0:038)
Mortgages 0:583  0:077 0:104 : 0:045 0:003 0:005 0:001 0:004 0:007
(0:051) (0:023) (0:046) : (0:112) (0:033) (0:016) (0:002) (0:044) (0:025)
Bank Deposits 0:323  0:003  0:001  0:037 : 0:071 0:292 0:578  0:300  0:042
(0:126) (0:010) (0:004) (0:040) : (0:038) (0:028) (0:055) (0:050) (0:029)
Building S.Dep. 0:266  0:002  0:001  0:021 0:159 : 0:109 0:165  0:208  0:030
(0:024) (0:006) (0:002) (0:023) (0:073) : (0:044) (0:111) (0:032) (0:017)
Stocks  0:231  0:003  0:001  0:043 0:484 0:067 :  0:731  0:210  0:069
(0:077) (0:011) (0:004) (0:047) (0:146) (0:047) : (0:195) (0:063) (0:034)
Bonds  0:560  0:004  0:002  0:054 0:542 0:173  0:519 :  0:171  0:121
(0:581) (0:014) (0:005) (0:059) (0:189) (0:076) (0:224) : (0:105) (0:048)
Insurances 1:165  0:001  0:000  0:013 0:124  0:013  0:384  0:734 :  0:041
(0:020) (0:003) (0:001) (0:014) (0:044) (0:015) (0:033) (0:084) : (0:010)
Credits 0:676  0:002  0:001  0:024 0:194 0:007  0:105  0:683  0:005 :
(0:019) (0:006) (0:002) (0:026) (0:081) (0:027) (0:053) (0:134) (0:036) :
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
Elasticities are computed at the mean of all covariates. b j is the unconditional budget elasticity on asset levels, b "
(r)
jj is the
unconditional own-rate elasticity of asset j on asset levels. b "
(r)
jk is the respective unconditional cross-rate elasticity.
a: Null hypothesis for the budget elasticities is b j = 1.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
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Table D.5: SUR Estimates for Conditional Asset Demand for Housing Assets at the 1.Stage





log total gross budget -0.0470 (0.0028)
log total gross budget sq. 0.0063 (0.0002)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile 0.0148 (0.0035)
3. quintile 0.0983 (0.0037)
4. quintile 0.2024 (0.0037)
5. quintile 0.1649 (0.0038)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 0.0329 (0.0048)
35 - 40 0.0389 (0.0047)
40 - 45 0.0330 (0.0048)
45 - 50 0.0189 (0.0049)
50 - 55 0.0025 (0.0050)
55 - 60 -0.0032 (0.0052)
60 - 65 -0.0111 (0.0058)
65 - 70 -0.0294 (0.0068)
70 - 75 -0.0525 (0.0071)
75 and older -0.0704 (0.0070)
education:
educ degree high 0.0117 (0.0023)
educ degree med 0.0078 (0.0026)
educ degree low (ref.)
educ degree non -0.0022 (0.0055)
social status:
selfemployed 0.0146 (0.0042)




nonemployed, student 0.0090 (0.0043)
household type:
single female 0.0237 (0.0048)
single male 0.0078 (0.0048)
single parent 0.0155 (0.0056)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid 0.0218 (0.0032)
couple,  2 kids 0.0387 (0.0031)
other households -0.0077 (0.0050)
demographics:











year 2003 -0.0027 (0.0025)
E[sj j atot > 0] 0.132
Observations 85,699
R2 0.159
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Additional covariates: a constant. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
64Table D.6: SUR Estimates for Conditional Asset Demand for Housing Assets at the 2.Stage
Owner-Occupied Housing Non-Owner-Occupied Housing
dep. var.: share of asset j from housing assets (2 [0; 1]) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE)
prices:
ln(pooc) -2.3410 (0.2824) -0.3297 (0.1826)
ln(pnoc) 0.7783 (0.4563) -0.8190 (0.2951)
ln(pmor) 0.7732 (0.1420) 0.9282 (0.0918)
housing budget:
log housing budget -0.0444 (0.0026) -0.0165 (0.0017)
log housing budget sq. 0.0069 (0.0002) 0.0034 (0.0001)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile 0.0139 (0.0152) 0.0076 (0.0099)
3. quintile -0.0341 (0.0123) -0.0109 (0.0080)
4. quintile -0.0314 (0.0120) -0.0221 (0.0078)
5. quintile -0.0015 (0.0121) 0.0235 (0.0078)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 -0.0265 (0.0131) -0.0047 (0.0085)
35 - 40 -0.0591 (0.0127) -0.0035 (0.0082)
40 - 45 -0.0583 (0.0128) 0.0021 (0.0083)
45 - 50 -0.0523 (0.0129) 0.0070 (0.0083)
50 - 55 -0.0341 (0.0132) 0.0139 (0.0085)
55 - 60 -0.0192 (0.0135) 0.0297 (0.0087)
60 - 65 0.0083 (0.0147) 0.0450 (0.0095)
65 - 70 0.0671 (0.0171) 0.0676 (0.0110)
70 - 75 0.1321 (0.0188) 0.0628 (0.0122)
75 and older 0.2282 (0.0197) 0.1086 (0.0127)
education:
educ degree high -0.0248 (0.0045) 0.0107 (0.0029)
educ degree med -0.0112 (0.0051) 0.0045 (0.0033)
educ degree low (ref.)
educ degree non 0.0181 (0.0172) 0.0120 (0.0111)
social status:
selfemployed -0.0086 (0.0072) 0.0117 (0.0047)
public servants 0.0077 (0.0053) 0.0020 (0.0034)
employee (ref.)
workers 0.0115 (0.0061) 0.0049 (0.0039)
pensioners 0.0543 (0.0096) -0.0012 (0.0062)
nonemployed, student 0.0253 (0.0113) 0.0153 (0.0073)
household type:
single female -0.0346 (0.0115) -0.0102 (0.0075)
single male -0.0452 (0.0115) 0.0143 (0.0075)
single parent -0.0282 (0.0130) -0.0165 (0.0084)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid -0.0166 (0.0060) -0.0118 (0.0039)
couple,  2 kids -0.0291 (0.0060) -0.0158 (0.0038)
other households 0.0195 (0.0097) 0.0068 (0.0063)
demographics:
employed > 2 -0.0093 (0.0043) -0.0051 (0.0028)
female -0.0019 (0.0059) 0.0073 (0.0038)
married -0.0217 (0.0084) -0.0118 (0.0054)
divorced -0.0188 (0.0096) -0.0081 (0.0062)
german 0.0382 (0.0159) 0.0080 (0.0103)
east germany 0.0899 (0.0057) 0.0425 (0.0037)
time:
quart1 -0.0284 (0.0054) -0.0069 (0.0035)
quarter 2 (ref.)
quart3 -0.0026 (0.0050) 0.0013 (0.0032)
quart4 -0.0129 (0.0050) -0.0000 (0.0032)
year 2003 0.0195 (0.0058) -0.0073 (0.0037)
E[sj j atot > 0] 0.170 0.060
Observations 32,961 32,961
R2 0.094 0.063
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Additional covariates: a constant. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
65Table D.7: SUR Estimates for Conditional Asset Demand for Financial Assets at the 2.Stage
Bank Deposits Building Stocks Bonds Insurances
dep. var.: share (2 [0; 1]) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE)
prices:
ln(pdep) 1.0027 (0.4115) 1.0274 (0.2911) -1.6215 (0.2224) -0.1239 (0.0856) -0.6089 (0.2910)
ln(pbui) 0.1779 (0.0416) -0.4661 (0.0294) 0.0502 (0.0225) -0.0055 (0.0086) 0.1475 (0.0294)
ln(psto) -1.4111 (0.1184) -0.1713 (0.0837) 0.3086 (0.0640) 0.0645 (0.0246) 1.0328 (0.0837)
ln(pbon) -6.7800 (0.6474) -0.6700 (0.4579) 1.3260 (0.3498) 0.1407 (0.1346) 4.0302 (0.4577)
ln(pins) 3.1283 (0.0608) 0.7214 (0.0430) 0.3722 (0.0329) 0.0455 (0.0126) -4.3545 (0.0430)
ln(pcre) 1.3802 (0.0390) 0.3006 (0.0276) 0.2906 (0.0211) 0.0587 (0.0081) 0.4060 (0.0276)
ﬁnancial budget:
log ﬁnancial budget 0.0783 (0.0042) 0.0903 (0.0030) -0.0546 (0.0023) -0.0123 (0.0009) -0.0182 (0.0030)
log ﬁnancial budget sq. 0.0045 (0.0004) -0.0107 (0.0003) 0.0073 (0.0002) 0.0017 (0.0001) -0.0080 (0.0003)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile -0.0423 (0.0051) 0.0652 (0.0036) 0.0213 (0.0027) -0.0004 (0.0011) 0.0516 (0.0036)
3. quintile -0.1245 (0.0058) 0.0945 (0.0041) 0.0224 (0.0031) 0.0004 (0.0012) 0.0375 (0.0041)
4. quintile -0.1457 (0.0061) 0.1190 (0.0043) 0.0144 (0.0033) -0.0009 (0.0013) 0.0215 (0.0043)
5. quintile -0.1890 (0.0065) 0.1319 (0.0046) 0.0347 (0.0035) 0.0012 (0.0013) 0.0402 (0.0046)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 0.0045 (0.0067) -0.0444 (0.0047) 0.0053 (0.0036) 0.0004 (0.0014) 0.0128 (0.0047)
35 - 40 0.0228 (0.0066) -0.0579 (0.0047) -0.0038 (0.0036) 0.0007 (0.0014) 0.0179 (0.0047)
40 - 45 0.0313 (0.0067) -0.0674 (0.0048) -0.0090 (0.0036) 0.0007 (0.0014) 0.0213 (0.0048)
45 - 50 0.0335 (0.0069) -0.0668 (0.0048) -0.0142 (0.0037) 0.0005 (0.0014) 0.0244 (0.0048)
50 - 55 0.0444 (0.0071) -0.0635 (0.0050) -0.0232 (0.0038) 0.0002 (0.0015) 0.0222 (0.0050)
55 - 60 0.0414 (0.0073) -0.0614 (0.0051) -0.0213 (0.0039) 0.0017 (0.0015) 0.0225 (0.0051)
60 - 65 0.0530 (0.0082) -0.0643 (0.0058) -0.0197 (0.0044) 0.0010 (0.0017) 0.0165 (0.0058)
65 - 70 0.0879 (0.0096) -0.0713 (0.0068) -0.0251 (0.0052) 0.0037 (0.0020) -0.0030 (0.0068)
70 - 75 0.1519 (0.0101) -0.1115 (0.0071) -0.0316 (0.0054) 0.0036 (0.0021) -0.0036 (0.0071)
75 and older 0.2097 (0.0099) -0.1420 (0.0070) -0.0333 (0.0053) 0.0046 (0.0021) -0.0166 (0.0070)
education:
educ degree high -0.0198 (0.0032) 0.0076 (0.0023) 0.0137 (0.0017) 0.0015 (0.0007) 0.0002 (0.0023)
educ degree med -0.0057 (0.0036) 0.0073 (0.0026) 0.0034 (0.0020) -0.0009 (0.0008) -0.0012 (0.0026)
educ degree low (ref.)
educ degree non 0.0669 (0.0078) -0.0144 (0.0055) -0.0004 (0.0042) -0.0015 (0.0016) -0.0318 (0.0055)
social status:
selfemployed -0.1287 (0.0060) -0.0419 (0.0042) 0.0096 (0.0032) -0.0014 (0.0012) 0.1476 (0.0042)
public servants -0.0107 (0.0043) 0.0326 (0.0031) -0.0133 (0.0023) -0.0024 (0.0009) -0.0043 (0.0031)
employee (ref.)
workers -0.0043 (0.0045) 0.0042 (0.0031) -0.0168 (0.0024) -0.0014 (0.0009) 0.0033 (0.0031)
pensioners 0.0180 (0.0066) -0.0280 (0.0047) -0.0143 (0.0036) -0.0004 (0.0014) 0.0331 (0.0047)
nonemployed, student 0.0635 (0.0062) -0.0587 (0.0044) -0.0119 (0.0034) 0.0009 (0.0013) 0.0258 (0.0044)
household type:
single female 0.0617 (0.0067) -0.0036 (0.0048) 0.0094 (0.0036) 0.0034 (0.0014) -0.0541 (0.0048)
single male 0.0359 (0.0068) -0.0143 (0.0048) 0.0232 (0.0037) 0.0039 (0.0014) -0.0592 (0.0048)
single parent 0.0327 (0.0078) -0.0082 (0.0056) -0.0072 (0.0042) 0.0014 (0.0016) -0.0210 (0.0055)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid -0.0154 (0.0045) 0.0168 (0.0032) -0.0070 (0.0024) -0.0017 (0.0009) 0.0105 (0.0032)
couple,  2 kids -0.0133 (0.0043) 0.0224 (0.0030) -0.0151 (0.0023) -0.0024 (0.0009) 0.0118 (0.0030)
other households 0.0144 (0.0071) 0.0159 (0.0050) -0.0208 (0.0038) -0.0051 (0.0015) -0.0039 (0.0050)
demographics, time:
employed > 2 -0.0003 (0.0034) 0.0206 (0.0024) -0.0057 (0.0018) -0.0015 (0.0007) -0.0035 (0.0024)
female -0.0036 (0.0043) -0.0004 (0.0031) -0.0059 (0.0023) -0.0007 (0.0009) 0.0031 (0.0031)
married -0.0147 (0.0052) 0.0047 (0.0037) -0.0061 (0.0028) -0.0005 (0.0011) 0.0002 (0.0037)
divorced -0.0147 (0.0054) 0.0053 (0.0038) -0.0043 (0.0029) -0.0002 (0.0011) -0.0006 (0.0038)
german -0.0270 (0.0103) 0.0131 (0.0073) 0.0088 (0.0056) -0.0034 (0.0021) 0.0009 (0.0073)
east germany 0.0058 (0.0035) -0.0157 (0.0025) 0.0073 (0.0019) 0.0012 (0.0007) 0.0042 (0.0025)
quart1 -0.0267 (0.0039) 0.0062 (0.0028) -0.0021 (0.0021) 0.0022 (0.0008) 0.0163 (0.0028)
quarter 2 (ref.)
quart3 -0.0187 (0.0037) 0.0059 (0.0026) 0.0066 (0.0020) 0.0009 (0.0008) 0.0020 (0.0026)
quart4 -0.0014 (0.0036) 0.0112 (0.0026) -0.0107 (0.0019) -0.0025 (0.0007) 0.0108 (0.0026)
year 2003 0.1098 (0.0064) -0.0841 (0.0046) -0.0155 (0.0035) -0.0036 (0.0013) 0.0118 (0.0046)
E[sj j atot > 0] 0.477 0.142 0.059 0.008 0.201
Observations 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046
R2 0.226 0.094 0.070 0.021 0.301
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Additional covariates: a constant. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
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Table D.8: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Conditional Probability of Positive Demand for
1.Stage Assets (Marg. Eﬀects and SE)
Housing Assets Financial Assets
dep.var.: demand probability Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE)
tax rate:
marginal tax rate in % 0.0018 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0002)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 0.0776 (0.0095) -0.0071 (0.0114)
35 - 40 0.0959 (0.0094) -0.0085 (0.0111)
40 - 45 0.0980 (0.0094) -0.0082 (0.0112)
45 - 50 0.0738 (0.0094) -0.0090 (0.0113)
50 - 55 0.0601 (0.0090) -0.0034 (0.0113)
55 - 60 0.0489 (0.0094) -0.0071 (0.0115)
60 - 65 0.0466 (0.0102) -0.0121 (0.0121)
65 - 70 0.0269 (0.0116) -0.0197 (0.0133)
70 - 75 -0.0259 (0.0122) -0.0201 (0.0143)
75 and older -0.0935 (0.0129) -0.0278 (0.0143)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile -0.0033 (0.0087) -0.0055 (0.0109)
3. quintile 0.1768 (0.0082) -0.0212 (0.0086)
4. quintile 0.3732 (0.0101) -0.0435 (0.0094)
5. quintile 0.3469 (0.0109) -0.0497 (0.0102)
total budget:
log total gross budget 0.2265 (0.0078) 0.0365 (0.0110)
log total gross budget sq. -0.0110 (0.0007) -0.0000 (0.0009)
education:
educ degree high 0.0076 (0.0033) -0.0080 (0.0043)
educ degree med 0.0128 (0.0038) -0.0023 (0.0050)
educ degree low (ref.)
educ degree non -0.0163 (0.0109) -0.0019 (0.0146)
social status:
selfemployed -0.0180 (0.0056) -0.0089 (0.0074)
household type:
single female -0.0218 (0.0054) -0.0057 (0.0072)
single male -0.0330 (0.0063) -0.0043 (0.0083)
single parent 0.0253 (0.0079) -0.0130 (0.0101)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid 0.0458 (0.0045) -0.0002 (0.0060)
couple,  2 kids 0.0791 (0.0044) -0.0005 (0.0058)
other households -0.0073 (0.0068) -0.0000 (0.0092)
location:
east germany -0.0098 (0.0037) 0.0026 (0.0051)
time:
year 2003 0.0129 (0.0027) 0.0020 (0.0036)
Pr(sj > 0) 0.273 0.881
N 91,904 91,904
Pseudo-R2 0.451 0.451
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are average marginal eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses, estimated by the delta method,
assuming zero covariance between alternatives.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Additional covariates: a constant. Inclusive values omitted from estimation.
Descriptive probabilities weighted by population weights.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
67Table D.9: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Conditional Probability of Positive Demand for
Housing Assets (Marg. Eﬀects and SE)
Owner-Occupied Non-Owner-Occ. Mortgages
dep.var.: demand probability Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE)
tax rate:
marginal tax rate in % -0.0050 (0.0003) 0.0008 (0.0002) 0.0043 (0.0003)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 -0.0410 (0.0228) -0.0099 (0.0188) 0.0404 (0.0210)
35 - 40 -0.0878 (0.0210) -0.0173 (0.0174) 0.0929 (0.0203)
40 - 45 -0.0973 (0.0212) 0.0021 (0.0198) 0.0827 (0.0204)
45 - 50 -0.0887 (0.0216) 0.0099 (0.0205) 0.0670 (0.0205)
50 - 55 -0.0714 (0.0227) 0.0256 (0.0226) 0.0394 (0.0209)
55 - 60 -0.0518 (0.0240) 0.0506 (0.0253) -0.0037 (0.0212)
60 - 65 -0.0283 (0.0256) 0.0623 (0.0268) -0.0326 (0.0220)
65 - 70 -0.0032 (0.0294) 0.0960 (0.0327) -0.0958 (0.0233)
70 - 75 0.0568 (0.0330) 0.0856 (0.0342) -0.1430 (0.0244)
75 and older 0.1170 (0.0385) 0.1389 (0.0409) -0.2537 (0.0239)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile 0.0064 (0.0260) 0.0157 (0.0197) -0.0253 (0.0240)
3. quintile -0.0451 (0.0204) -0.0104 (0.0143) 0.0555 (0.0199)
4. quintile -0.0369 (0.0196) -0.0447 (0.0114) 0.0833 (0.0193)
5. quintile 0.0092 (0.0213) 0.0274 (0.0163) -0.0181 (0.0198)
housing budget:
log housing budget 0.0328 (0.0365) 0.0759 (0.0332) 0.2357 (0.0377)
log housing budget sq. 0.0092 (0.0005) 0.0024 (0.0004) -0.0176 (0.0006)
education:
educ degree high -0.0300 (0.0083) 0.0245 (0.0069) 0.0105 (0.0072)
educ degree med -0.0144 (0.0095) 0.0096 (0.0077) 0.0092 (0.0084)
educ degree low (ref.)
educ degree non 0.0187 (0.0284) 0.0226 (0.0243) -0.0264 (0.0261)
social status:
selfemployed -0.0280 (0.0143) 0.0195 (0.0107) -0.0017 (0.0119)
household type:
single female -0.0199 (0.0141) 0.0059 (0.0105) 0.0033 (0.0128)
single male -0.0160 (0.0179) 0.0299 (0.0135) -0.0144 (0.0154)
single parent -0.0281 (0.0220) -0.0059 (0.0155) 0.0344 (0.0194)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid -0.0162 (0.0113) -0.0217 (0.0073) 0.0344 (0.0100)
couple,  2 kids -0.0252 (0.0107) -0.0299 (0.0067) 0.0524 (0.0096)
other households 0.0224 (0.0163) -0.0018 (0.0113) -0.0095 (0.0148)
location:
east germany 0.0768 (0.0114) 0.0663 (0.0101) -0.1287 (0.0088)
time:
year 2003 -0.0009 (0.0071) 0.0038 (0.0052) 0.0076 (0.0062)
Pr(sj > 0 j ahou > 0) 0.228 0.090 0.834
Pr(ahou > 0) 0.269 0.269 0.269
Pr(sj > 0) 0.063 0.025 0.223
N 32,961 32,961 32,961
Pseudo-R2 0.118 0.118 0.118
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are average marginal eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses, estimated by the delta method,
assuming zero covariance between alternatives.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Additional covariates: a constant.
Descriptive probabilities weighted by population weights.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
68Table D.10: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Conditional Probability of Positive Demand for
Financial Assets (Marg. Eﬀects and SE)
Bank Dep. Build.-Soc.D. Equities Insurances C.Credits
dep.var.: demand probability Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE) Mfx (SE)
tax rate:
marginal tax rate in % -0.003 (0.000) 0.002 (0.000) 0.002 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 -0.003 (0.009) -0.107 (0.009) -0.008 (0.006) 0.053 (0.009) 0.032 (0.008)
35 - 40 0.014 (0.009) -0.142 (0.008) -0.032 (0.006) 0.072 (0.008) 0.038 (0.008)
40 - 45 0.011 (0.009) -0.176 (0.008) -0.050 (0.006) 0.088 (0.008) 0.051 (0.008)
45 - 50 0.010 (0.009) -0.163 (0.008) -0.071 (0.005) 0.104 (0.008) 0.061 (0.009)
50 - 55 0.012 (0.009) -0.166 (0.008) -0.089 (0.005) 0.101 (0.008) 0.055 (0.009)
55 - 60 0.021 (0.010) -0.178 (0.008) -0.097 (0.005) 0.084 (0.009) 0.032 (0.009)
60 - 65 0.035 (0.010) -0.210 (0.008) -0.104 (0.005) 0.034 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009)
65 - 70 0.082 (0.011) -0.237 (0.009) -0.119 (0.005) -0.061 (0.011) -0.028 (0.010)
70 - 75 0.166 (0.011) -0.341 (0.008) -0.153 (0.005) -0.116 (0.012) -0.097 (0.009)
75 and older 0.217 (0.010) -0.394 (0.006) -0.135 (0.005) -0.153 (0.012) -0.201 (0.008)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile -0.061 (0.007) 0.170 (0.007) 0.103 (0.007) 0.188 (0.006) -0.164 (0.004)
3. quintile -0.115 (0.007) 0.239 (0.007) 0.145 (0.007) 0.204 (0.006) -0.255 (0.004)
4. quintile -0.127 (0.007) 0.282 (0.007) 0.136 (0.007) 0.172 (0.006) -0.274 (0.004)
5. quintile -0.183 (0.007) 0.310 (0.007) 0.176 (0.007) 0.189 (0.006) -0.333 (0.004)
ﬁnancial budget:
log ﬁnancial budget 0.007 (0.013) 0.704 (0.011) -0.061 (0.006) 0.549 (0.006) 0.280 (0.006)
log ﬁnancial budget sq. 0.017 (0.001) -0.055 (0.001) 0.010 (0.000) -0.045 (0.001) -0.023 (0.001)
education:
educ degree high -0.028 (0.004) -0.024 (0.004) 0.027 (0.003) -0.079 (0.004) -0.018 (0.004)
educ degree med -0.014 (0.005) -0.005 (0.005) 0.015 (0.004) -0.017 (0.005) -0.005 (0.005)
educ degree low (ref.)
educ degree non 0.077 (0.011) -0.065 (0.011) -0.042 (0.009) -0.105 (0.011) -0.048 (0.010)
social status:
selfemployed -0.148 (0.009) -0.117 (0.007) -0.015 (0.005) 0.075 (0.008) 0.053 (0.007)
household type:
single female 0.112 (0.006) -0.039 (0.006) -0.002 (0.005) -0.111 (0.006) -0.074 (0.005)
single male 0.087 (0.007) -0.090 (0.007) 0.024 (0.006) -0.138 (0.007) -0.044 (0.006)
single parent 0.073 (0.009) -0.024 (0.009) -0.026 (0.006) -0.043 (0.009) 0.003 (0.008)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid -0.037 (0.006) 0.063 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) 0.059 (0.006) 0.042 (0.006)
couple,  2 kids -0.046 (0.006) 0.073 (0.006) -0.021 (0.004) 0.073 (0.006) 0.063 (0.005)
other households 0.002 (0.010) 0.055 (0.010) -0.037 (0.006) 0.039 (0.009) 0.030 (0.009)
location:
east germany 0.006 (0.005) 0.024 (0.005) 0.035 (0.004) 0.036 (0.005) -0.013 (0.004)
time:
year 2003 0.076 (0.004) -0.094 (0.004) -0.006 (0.003) -0.018 (0.004) 0.019 (0.003)
Pr(sj > 0 j afin > 0) 0.621 0.377 0.156 0.550 0.296
Pr(afin > 0) 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881
Pr(sj > 0) 0.555 0.328 0.134 0.479 0.255
N 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046
Pseudo-R2 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are computed at the mean of all covariates.
Standard errors in parentheses, estimated from univariate probit regressions by the delta method.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Additional covariates: a constant.
Descriptive probabilities weighted by population weights.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
69D.4 Results - Estimation - Reduced-Form Model - Continuous Choice
Table D.11: SUR Estimates of Conditional Asset Demand at the 1.Stage
Housing Assets Financial Assets
dep.var.: share in % Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE)
tax rate:
marginal tax rate in % 0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 3.19 (0.30) -3.19 (0.38)
35 - 40 4.06 (0.30) -4.06 (0.37)
40 - 45 3.61 (0.30) -3.61 (0.38)
45 - 50 2.17 (0.31) -2.17 (0.38)
50 - 55 0.61 (0.32) -0.61 (0.39)
55 - 60 0.14 (0.32) -0.14 (0.41)
60 - 65 -0.05 (0.33) 0.05 (0.43)
65 - 70 -1.11 (0.35) 1.11 (0.47)
70 - 75 -3.35 (0.36) 3.35 (0.49)
75 and older -4.90 (0.36) 4.90 (0.47)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile 0.22 (0.15) -0.22 (0.19)
3. quintile 6.29 (0.19) -6.29 (0.26)
4. quintile 17.89 (0.24) -17.89 (0.31)
5. quintile 14.01 (0.25) -14.01 (0.34)
total budget:
log total gross budget -6.14 (0.31) 6.14 (0.36)
log total gross budget sq. 0.71 (0.03) -0.71 (0.03)
social status:
selfemployed 0.48 (0.37) -0.48 (0.47)
household type:
single female 1.35 (0.20) -1.35 (0.28)
single male -0.29 (0.24) 0.29 (0.33)
single parent 2.27 (0.32) -2.27 (0.43)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid 2.80 (0.26) -2.80 (0.32)
couple,  2 kids 5.55 (0.25) -5.55 (0.31)
other households -1.70 (0.38) 1.70 (0.50)
location:
east germany -2.06 (0.16) 2.06 (0.21)
time:




E[sj j atot > 0] 13.2 86.8




Notes: Standard errors from ML estimation in parentheses,
robust to heteroskedasticity.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Additional covariates: a constant.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
70Table D.12: SUR Estimates of Conditional Demand for Housing Assets
Owner-Occupied Non-Owner-Occ. Mortgages
dep.var.: share in % Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE)
tax rate:
marginal tax rate in % -0.41 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.37 (0.02)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 -2.55 (0.97) -0.59 (0.52) 3.14 (1.42)
35 - 40 -5.70 (0.93) -0.56 (0.50) 6.26 (1.36)
40 - 45 -5.84 (0.93) -0.14 (0.50) 5.99 (1.36)
45 - 50 -6.08 (0.93) 0.17 (0.51) 5.91 (1.38)
50 - 55 -5.14 (0.95) 0.68 (0.53) 4.46 (1.40)
55 - 60 -4.11 (0.98) 2.35 (0.55) 1.76 (1.46)
60 - 65 -2.69 (1.05) 4.10 (0.60) -1.41 (1.56)
65 - 70 2.68 (1.25) 6.65 (0.73) -9.32 (1.81)
70 - 75 9.38 (1.57) 6.16 (0.83) -15.54 (2.18)
75 and older 19.31 (1.97) 10.50 (1.12) -29.81 (2.44)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile 2.03 (1.25) 1.04 (0.79) -3.07 (1.72)
3. quintile -2.80 (1.01) -0.78 (0.62) 3.58 (1.32)
4. quintile -3.03 (0.98) -2.37 (0.60) 5.40 (1.29)
5. quintile -0.44 (1.00) 1.19 (0.62) -0.74 (1.30)
housing budget:
log housing budget -8.90 (0.72) -2.09 (0.29) 10.99 (1.30)
log housing budget sq. 1.08 (0.06) 0.35 (0.03) -1.42 (0.11)
social status:
selfemployed -1.92 (0.45) 1.09 (0.34) 0.83 (0.77)
household type:
single female -0.39 (0.67) 0.61 (0.40) -0.22 (0.99)
single male -0.93 (0.71) 2.12 (0.51) -1.19 (1.05)
single parent -2.23 (0.70) 0.19 (0.44) 2.04 (1.12)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid -2.04 (0.41) -0.95 (0.25) 2.99 (0.65)
couple,  2 kids -2.56 (0.36) -1.07 (0.23) 3.64 (0.58)
other households 0.83 (0.82) 0.87 (0.46) -1.70 (1.20)
location:
east germany 5.85 (0.41) 3.68 (0.23) -9.53 (0.63)
time:





E[sj j ahou > 0] 17.0 6.0 77.1
Pr(ahou > 0) 0.269 0.269 0.269
E[sj] 4.6 1.6 20.7
Observations 32,961 32,961 32,961
R2 0.292 0.327 0.052
Notes: Standard errors from ML estimation in parentheses,
robust to heteroskedasticity.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Additional covariates: a constant.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
71Table D.13: SUR Estimates for Conditional Demand for Financial Assets
Bank Dep. Build.-Soc.D. Stocks Bonds Insurances C.Credits
dep.var.: share in % Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE) Coeﬀ (SE)
tax rate:
marginal tax rate in % -0.34 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) 0.20 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
age:
30 and younger (ref.)
30 - 35 -2.03 (0.67) -4.69 (0.48) 0.32 (0.36) 0.04 (0.10) 3.36 (0.43) 3.02 (0.47)
35 - 40 -1.09 (0.65) -6.51 (0.46) -0.73 (0.34) 0.05 (0.10) 5.01 (0.43) 3.27 (0.45)
40 - 45 -1.08 (0.66) -7.57 (0.47) -1.37 (0.34) 0.02 (0.10) 6.29 (0.44) 3.71 (0.46)
45 - 50 -1.67 (0.66) -7.31 (0.47) -2.00 (0.34) -0.02 (0.11) 7.13 (0.45) 3.87 (0.46)
50 - 55 -0.88 (0.68) -6.93 (0.48) -2.89 (0.35) -0.06 (0.12) 7.36 (0.47) 3.39 (0.46)
55 - 60 -0.71 (0.70) -6.72 (0.50) -2.55 (0.37) 0.13 (0.13) 7.33 (0.49) 2.53 (0.46)
60 - 65 0.73 (0.75) -6.38 (0.54) -2.10 (0.39) 0.07 (0.13) 5.95 (0.52) 1.74 (0.48)
65 - 70 5.83 (0.84) -6.37 (0.59) -2.27 (0.42) 0.35 (0.17) 1.34 (0.56) 1.13 (0.52)
70 - 75 13.20 (0.91) -10.09 (0.62) -2.84 (0.44) 0.35 (0.18) 0.36 (0.61) -0.99 (0.52)
75 and older 20.05 (0.88) -12.83 (0.57) -2.94 (0.44) 0.46 (0.19) -1.71 (0.57) -3.02 (0.48)
stock of net assets:
1. quintile (ref.)
2. quintile -3.51 (0.51) 6.93 (0.30) 2.62 (0.19) 0.09 (0.05) 11.47 (0.36) -17.60 (0.43)
3. quintile -6.94 (0.49) 10.87 (0.30) 4.03 (0.20) 0.44 (0.07) 14.14 (0.35) -22.54 (0.42)
4. quintile -7.30 (0.50) 13.67 (0.32) 3.56 (0.20) 0.37 (0.07) 12.72 (0.35) -23.02 (0.43)
5. quintile -11.93 (0.53) 14.67 (0.34) 5.80 (0.23) 0.64 (0.08) 16.74 (0.38) -25.92 (0.44)
ﬁnancial budget:
log ﬁnancial budget 6.59 (0.51) 9.22 (0.23) -5.56 (0.24) -1.28 (0.10) -1.31 (0.51) -7.65 (0.47)
log ﬁnancial budget sq. 0.54 (0.05) -1.12 (0.02) 0.73 (0.03) 0.17 (0.01) -0.82 (0.04) 0.50 (0.04)
social status:
selfemployed -14.86 (0.58) -4.03 (0.39) 1.67 (0.36) -0.10 (0.12) 16.42 (0.55) 0.91 (0.36)
household type:
single female 10.39 (0.47) -1.65 (0.31) 1.52 (0.23) 0.43 (0.10) -6.70 (0.34) -3.99 (0.28)
single male 7.82 (0.58) -2.94 (0.35) 3.43 (0.33) 0.57 (0.13) -7.43 (0.40) -1.43 (0.37)
single parent 5.04 (0.67) -1.35 (0.45) -0.25 (0.30) 0.20 (0.11) -3.65 (0.52) 0.01 (0.50)
couple, no kids (ref.)
couple, 1 kid -2.86 (0.43) 2.47 (0.31) -0.98 (0.24) -0.23 (0.09) 1.24 (0.32) 0.35 (0.27)
couple,  2 kids -3.05 (0.40) 2.94 (0.29) -1.75 (0.22) -0.29 (0.08) 1.69 (0.30) 0.47 (0.26)
other households 0.72 (0.68) 1.82 (0.49) -2.15 (0.37) -0.57 (0.13) -0.18 (0.48) 0.35 (0.39)
location:
east germany 0.19 (0.34) -0.70 (0.23) 1.04 (0.17) 0.13 (0.06) -0.74 (0.24) 0.07 (0.22)
time:








E[sj j afin > 0] 47.7 14.2 5.9 0.8 20.1 11.4
Pr(afin > 0) 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881
E[sj] 42.0 12.5 5.2 0.7 17.7 10.0
Observations 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046 84,046
R2 0.190 0.084 0.065 0.018 0.214 0.142
Notes: Standard errors from ML estimation in parentheses, robust to heteroskedasticity.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Additional covariates: a constant.
Source: Own calculations with the EVS data (1998, 2003).
72D.5 Results - Tax Eﬀects
The tax elasticity of cluster l is determined at the upper stage of the 2SBM, which is estimated
conditional on positive total asset demand so that there are eﬀects at the intensive as well as at
the extensive margin. The unconditional expected value of asset demand for cluster l can thus
be written: E[sl] = Pr[atot > 0]E[sljatot > 0], where E[sl] is the unconditional expected value
of asset share in cluster l, E[sljatot > 0] is the respective share conditional on positive total
asset demand, and Pr[atot > 0] is the probability of positive total asset demand. It follows for






E[sljatot > 0] +
@E[sljatot > 0]
@t
Pr[atot > 0] (30)






















 E[sljatot > 0]  Pr[atot > 0]
E[sl]
(32)
where "E[sljatot>0];t and "Pr[atot>0];t are the tax elasticity of conditional asset demand for cluster
l and the tax elasticity of the probability of positive asset demand, respectively.
Table D.14: Conditional and Unconditional Tax Eﬀects on Cluster Asset Demand Shares
 sl  slja Mfxslja Patot MfxPatot Mfxsl "l l
Housing Assets 15:5 16:7 0:030 0:932  0:00001 0:028 0:040 0:130
(27:9) (12:2) (0:007) (0:246) (0:00002) (0:007) (0:009) (0:029)
Financial Assets 77:7 83:3  0:030 0:932  0:00001  0:029  0:008  0:078
(34:6) (11:3) (0:010) (0:246) (0:00002) (0:009) (0:003) (0:007)
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method or standard deviations in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0:05,
**p < 0:01, ***p < 0:001. Marginal eﬀects computed at the mean of all covariates.  sl is the (unweighted) unconditional share of
cluster l assets.
P
l  sl = 93:2, which is the (unweighted) share of households with positive demand for any assets.  slja is the (un-
weighted) share of cluster l assets, conditional on positive total asset demand, and Mfxslja = @E[sl jatot > 0]=@t is the marginal
tax eﬀect on this share. Patot is the (unweighted) probability of positive demand for any assets, and MfxPatot = @Pr[atot > 0]=@t
is the marginal tax eﬀect on this probability. Mfxsl = @E[sl]=@t is the marginal tax eﬀect on the unconditional share of cluster
l assets. "l is the corresponding tax elasticity, and l the budget elasticity, where for t and atot conditional means are applied.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
74For calculations of total marginal tax eﬀects in similar settings, see Agell and Edin (1990), or King and Leape
(1998), or Dubin and McFadden (1984).

































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Financial Budget (Deciles)
Bank Deposits Build. Soc. Dep. Stocks
Bonds Insurances Cons. Credits
Financial Assets
Notes: Direct tax effects of a 10%−points increase in the MTR − at the mean MTR of 18.6% − on the conditional asset share.
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Household Marginal Tax Rate
Bank Deposits Build. Soc. Dep. Stocks
Bonds Insurances Cons. Credits
Financial Assets
Notes: Total tax effects of a 10%−points increase in the MTR − at the mean MTR of 18.6% − on the conditional asset share.
75